Sudan Civil War 2026: El Obeid Under Siege, the Drone War and Regional Spillover

WHAT CHANGED SINCE APRIL

The April edition of this briefing described Sudan as a fragmented, multi-front war that was spreading instability to its neighbours. That description still holds, but the shape of the war is now clearer. After the RSF captured El Fasher on 27 October 2025, following an 18-month siege, the country was in effect divided. The RSF and its allies hold almost all of Darfur and much of West Kordofan, where they have declared a rival administration. The army holds Khartoum, the east, the north and the Red Sea coast, with its government based in Port Sudan. Kordofan lies between the two and has become the main battlefield.

Three further changes stand out. Drones have replaced ground assaults as the principal means of attacking cities. Diplomacy has stalled, and Washington now says that neither commanding general has a future in government. And a UN investigation published in September has set out in detail how recruiters, transit states and arms suppliers outside Sudan sustain the fighting.

TIMELINE: OCTOBER 2025 TO SEPTEMBER 2026

• 16–27 October 2025: The RSF takes Bara in North Kordofan and then El Fasher, the last major city in Darfur under army control. The International Organization for Migration estimates that at least 62,000 people fled the El Fasher area between 26 and 29 October.
• November 2025: The RSF captures En Nahud on 1 November. A drone strike on a funeral outside El Obeid on 3 November kills at least 40 people. The RSF announces a three-month humanitarian truce under the plan of the "Quad" (the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE). Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan calls the proposal the "worst yet".
• December 2025: The RSF takes full control of Babanusa on 1 December and the Heglig oilfield on 8 December after the army withdraws. On 4 December a drone strike blamed on the RSF kills at least 116 people, 43 of them children, in Kalogi, South Kordofan.
• January–February 2026: The army breaks the sieges of Dilling (27 January) and Kadugli (3 February), each of which had lasted more than two and a half years. On the day Kadugli is relieved, shelling by the SPLM-N kills 44 people at its market.
• March: The army retakes Bara on 5 March and loses it again on 16 March.
• 28 April: The UN Security Council sanctions Algoney Hamdan Dagalo, the RSF's head of procurement, and three Colombian nationals who supported RSF military operations.
• June: ACLED records 27 drone-strike events around El Obeid, the highest monthly total of the war. On 20 June the Security Council warns of "substantial RSF reinforcements around El Obeid" and says more than 500,000 people are in danger. The SPLM-N loses its Kauda stronghold on 22 June.
• Late July: The army opens a ground offensive in North Kordofan and recaptures the Al Sadarat highway and five towns, including Bara, Um Sayala and Gebrat al-Sheikh.
• 12 August: The RSF launches kamikaze drones at El Obeid, Atbara, Omdurman and Khartoum on the same day. In mid-August the RSF and SPLM-N retake Kurmuk and Geisan on the Ethiopian border in Blue Nile state.
• 6–17 September: The army recaptures Hamrat al-Wiz and then reports taking 11 more areas in North Kordofan. An RSF drone strike on a courthouse in Umm Ruwaba kills 13 civilians on 8 September. The two sides clash outside El Obeid on 17 September, and the RSF shells the city afterwards.

EL OBEID AND THE BATTLE FOR KORDOFAN

El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, sits on the main road between RSF-held Darfur and the army-held centre and east. It hosts the army's 5th Infantry Division and an airbase, lies beside the oil pipeline to the coast and is the country's principal market for gum arabic. The analyst Ahmed Ben Omer told Al Jazeera that its fall would let the RSF "connect vast geographical areas". For the army, holding it keeps the RSF away from the Nile valley and Khartoum.

The army broke an earlier siege in February 2025. Since late 2025 the RSF has rebuilt its positions to the north, west and south, while the army keeps a supply road open to the east. ACLED assessed the situation in mid-2026 as a strategic stalemate. The army's summer offensive has widened the eastern corridor and secured the highway to Khartoum, which makes a full encirclement harder. It has not pushed RSF artillery and drones out of range of the city.

Conditions inside are poor. Al Jazeera reported in July that ten consecutive days of drone strikes had killed at least 50 civilians, that food prices had risen by 300% and that water prices had doubled. About 105,000 of the people in the city are already displaced from elsewhere. Strikes on power and fuel stations have forced hospitals and water plants to shut. The UN human rights chief, Volker Türk, said that civilians there "have been subjected to siege-like conditions for 18 months". In July the Human Rights Council asked its fact-finding mission to open an urgent inquiry into violations around the city.

DARFUR AFTER EL FASHER

The capture of El Fasher was followed by house-to-house searches, mass detention and summary executions. The World Health Organization reported that more than 460 patients and companions were killed at the Saudi Maternity Hospital alone. Amnesty International's July 2026 report describes the RSF campaign as involving crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and the UN fact-finding mission says RSF conduct in El Fasher and the Zamzam displacement camp bears "hallmarks of genocide".

Famine was confirmed in El Fasher and in Kadugli by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) in its September 2025 analysis, which found 21.2 million people in acute food insecurity and 375,000 in the catastrophic Phase 5. Malnutrition screening in El Fasher showed rates of 38% to 75%. The same analysis found that hunger eased in areas where fighting had stopped, which is the clearest evidence that the famine is caused by the war and by the blocking of aid.

The RSF has used its control of Darfur to build a parallel state. Its "Tasis" alliance announced a government in Nyala in 2025 with RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, at its head. No country has recognised it. Its existence nevertheless makes a Libya-style partition a realistic outcome.

WHO SUSTAINS THE WAR

The UN fact-finding mission reported in September that "external support networks" are fuelling the conflict and the harm to civilians. Its findings include:

• Foreign fighters: Up to 2,000 former Colombian soldiers have served with RSF units in Darfur and Kordofan, where they operate combat drones and artillery.
• Facilitators and routes: Recruitment and logistics run through companies in the United Arab Emirates, with transit through Chad, south-eastern Libya and Bosaso in Somalia. The UAE denies arming the RSF and has formally disputed the findings of the UN Panel of Experts.
• Drone capability: Mission member Mona Rishmawi described a "transnational chain of networks spanning several countries" that has improved the drone forces of both the RSF and the army.

The mission's chair, Mohamed Chande Othman, said that "the consequences of this external support are being felt most acutely by civilians". The mission recommends enforcing the existing Darfur arms embargo and extending it to the whole country.

DIPLOMACY: A ROADMAP WITHOUT TAKERS

The Quad roadmap of September 2025 calls for a three-month humanitarian truce, then a permanent ceasefire and a transition to civilian rule. A year later it has, in the words of The National, "not borne fruit". The RSF accepted the truce in principle but rejected the withdrawal arrangements and kept fighting. Burhan has said repeatedly that there will be no peace until the RSF is defeated. The UAE has accused him of "consistently obstructive behaviour". The Washington Institute analyst Areig Elhag observes that the RSF is "acting more smart than the military because they give the international community what they want to hear".

US policy hardened in September. Massad Boulos, the US envoy for Arab and African affairs, said there is "no future" for either general in post-war government. Washington is pressing for a UN arms embargo covering all of Sudan and has sanctioned the Sudanese government over alleged chemical weapons use. At the Security Council, Denmark, France, the UK and the US favour widening the embargo beyond Darfur. Russia, China and the African members oppose it. The result on 11 September was Resolution 2828, a one-month technical extension of the existing Darfur measures until 9 October, adopted by all 15 members.

A separate track run by the African Union, the EU, IGAD, the Arab League and the UN held consultations with Sudanese political blocs in Addis Ababa in late July. Both the civilian Somoud coalition and the RSF-aligned Tasis declined to take part.

REGIONAL SPILLOVER

• Chad: One of the main destinations for the 4.4 million people who have left Sudan, and a transit route for RSF supplies according to UN investigators. Both roles put pressure on a government with its own armed opposition.
• South Sudan: Its oil reaches the market through Sudanese pipelines. The RSF's seizure of the Heglig field in December 2025 put the main source of revenue for Juba inside the war zone.
• Ethiopia: The retaking of Kurmuk and Geisan by the RSF and SPLM-N in August brought fighting to the border in Blue Nile state, and the Security Council Report notes concern about regionalisation.
• Libya: South-eastern Libya serves as a corridor for fuel, vehicles and fighters. See our Libya briefing.
• Red Sea: Port Sudan, the army's wartime capital, lies on a coast that is now affected by the Houthi advance described in our Red Sea briefing.

The western routes through Darfur and Chad also connect the war to the Sahel.

THE HUMANITARIAN PICTURE

The UN's 2026 response plan counts 33.7 million people in need, 3.3 million more than in 2025. About 9.3 million are displaced inside the country. The plan asks for $2.9 billion to reach 20 million people, and it was about 16% funded in early April. Cholera, malaria, dengue and measles are spreading where health and water systems have collapsed.

There is a contrast between regions. More than a million people returned to Khartoum between late 2024 and September 2025 after the army retook the capital, and about 2.6 million have returned home nationwide. Many came back to looted houses and no services, and the 12 August drone strikes showed that the capital is still within reach of the war.

OUTLOOK: WHAT TO WATCH

• El Obeid after the rains. The dry season from October favours the RSF's vehicle-mounted forces. Whether the army's new corridor holds will decide if the city becomes a second El Fasher.
• 9 October at the Security Council. The temporary sanctions extension expires then, and the Panel of Experts' mandate ends on 12 October. A countrywide arms embargo would be the first significant change in the UN's approach since 2005. A Russian veto is possible.
• The UN General Assembly. Burhan is due to attend. Washington's statement that neither general has a future changes what he is being offered.
• Blue Nile and the Ethiopian border. Further RSF and SPLM-N gains there would open a front in the south-east and draw in another neighbour.

A negotiated end to the war is not in sight. The more likely course over the coming months is a continued contest for Kordofan, a hardening of the division between an army-run east and an RSF-run west, and a humanitarian emergency that remains underfunded.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

What is happening in Sudan in September 2026?

The war between the army (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is centred on Kordofan. The RSF surrounds El Obeid on three sides and attacks it with drones, while the army has retaken towns in North Kordofan since late July. On 17 September the army said it had recaptured 11 more areas.

Who controls what in Sudan?

The army holds Khartoum, the north, the east and the Red Sea coast, with its government in Port Sudan. The RSF holds almost all of Darfur, including El Fasher since October 2025, and much of West Kordofan, where it has declared a rival government based in Nyala.

Why is El Obeid important?

El Obeid lies on the main road between Darfur and central Sudan, hosts an army division and airbase, and sits beside the oil pipeline. About 500,000 people are trapped there. If it fell, the RSF could link its western territory to the approaches to Khartoum.

What happened in El Fasher?

The RSF captured El Fasher on 27 October 2025 after an 18-month siege. Mass killings followed, including more than 460 people at the Saudi Maternity Hospital according to the WHO. Amnesty International describes ethnic cleansing, and UN investigators say RSF conduct bears hallmarks of genocide.

How severe is the humanitarian crisis in Sudan?

It is the largest in the world. The UN counts 33.7 million people in need of aid in 2026, 9.3 million internally displaced and 4.4 million who have fled abroad. Famine has been confirmed in El Fasher and Kadugli, and the response plan was only about 16% funded in April.

Which foreign countries are involved in the Sudan war?

UN investigators reported in September 2026 that up to 2,000 former Colombian soldiers fight with the RSF, recruited through UAE-based facilitators and moved through Chad, Libya and Somalia. The UAE denies arming the RSF. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the US form the Quad mediation group.

Is there a ceasefire in Sudan?

No. The Quad's 2025 roadmap proposes a three-month humanitarian truce. The RSF accepted it in principle but kept fighting, and the army rejected it. In September 2026 the US said neither Burhan nor Hemedti has a future role in government.

How does the Sudan war affect neighbouring countries?

Chad and Egypt host large numbers of Sudanese refugees, South Sudan's oil exports depend on pipelines and fields inside the war zone, fighting has reached the Ethiopian border in Blue Nile state, and southern Libya serves as a supply corridor for the RSF.

AUTHOR

SOURCES AND REFERENCES

• Security Council Report – Sudan, September 2026 Monthly Forecast
• OHCHR – External support networks are fuelling conflict and civilian harm, UN Fact-Finding Mission warns
• UN News – Outside forces fuel Sudan war, new report finds
• Al Jazeera – El-Obeid under siege by RSF: could this be Sudan's next el-Fasher?
• Sudan Tribune – Sudan army recaptures 11 areas in North Kordofan from RSF
• Al Jazeera – UN extends partial Sudan arms embargo for a month
• The National – What is behind Washington's changing diplomatic tactics in Sudan's civil war?
• Amnesty International – RSF atrocities in El Fasher (July 2026 report)
• FAO / IPC – Famine conditions confirmed in El Fasher and Kadugli
• UN OCHA – Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026
• ACLED – Armed Conflict Location & Event Data