Libya 2026: Election Deal, Record Oil Output and a Contested US Power-Sharing Plan

WHAT CHANGED SINCE APRIL

The April edition of this briefing described Libya as a state held in "managed instability", divided between the Government of National Unity (GNU) of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in Tripoli and the eastern administration backed by Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA). That division remains. What has changed is the amount of outside pressure to end it, and the money available to make an arrangement worthwhile.

The Iran war has pushed oil prices well above $100 and made Libyan crude more valuable to Europe than at any point in a decade. Washington, through the presidential adviser Massad Boulos, has used that moment to press the two sides towards a shared government. The UN mission (UNSMIL), led by Hanna Tetteh, has pursued a separate route to elections. Both efforts have produced results on paper. Neither has yet changed who controls the guns.

TIMELINE: MAY 2025 TO SEPTEMBER 2026

• 12–14 May 2025: The commander of the Stability Support Apparatus, Abdel Ghani al-Kikli, is killed in Tripoli. Fighting follows between the 444th Brigade and the Radaa Special Deterrence Force, the heaviest fighting in the capital since 2022.
• 21 August 2025: UNSMIL announces a political roadmap with three tracks: an electoral framework, a unified government, and a structured dialogue on governance, the economy, security and reconciliation.
• September 2025: Tension returns to Tripoli over Dbeibah's demand that Radaa hand over Mitiga airport and prison. Clashes break out in Janzour, west of the capital.
• 11 April 2026: The two sides sign a unified budget of 190 billion dinars (about $30 billion), the first since 2013. The US, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar welcome it in a joint statement.
• 24 April: Reports of the Boulos power-sharing plan, with Dbeibah as prime minister and Saddam Haftar as head of the executive, provoke rejection from the Presidential Council and the High Council of State.
• 29 April: At a first "Smaller Convening" in Rome under UN auspices, representatives of the rival governments agree in principle to reconstitute the board of the High National Elections Commission (HNEC).
• 8 May: Fighting between GNU-affiliated forces and local groups shuts the Zawiya refinery, the country's largest, for two days. Three civilians and a refinery guard are killed.
• 25 May: The UN authorisation for inspecting ships suspected of breaking the arms embargo expires. The EU's Operation Irini loses its mandate for boardings on the high seas.
• 7 June: The UN structured dialogue ends with nearly 600 recommendations from about 120 participants and more than 13,000 survey responses.
• June: Saddam Haftar meets US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on 29 June. On 21 June the National Oil Corporation reports output of 1.5 million barrels a day of crude and condensate, the highest since 2013.
• 4–11 August: Clashes in Sorman and Zawiya kill at least five people on 4 August. Between 8 and 11 August drones hit fuel, naphtha and diesel tanks and a desalination plant at the Zawiya complex.
• 30 August: The parties sign an agreement in the Smaller Convening to reconstitute the HNEC board and amend the electoral framework, with parliamentary and presidential elections to be held within two years. The Security Council welcomes it on 8 September.

THE POLITICAL TRACK: TWO PLANS, ONE AGREEMENT

Libya's last attempt at elections collapsed in December 2021 over disputes about who could stand. Since then every transitional body has had an interest in delaying a vote that might remove it. The 30 August agreement is the first concrete step past that impasse in almost five years. It gives the country a new election commission board and an amended legal framework. It does not settle the hardest question, which is whether a single interim government should organise the vote. The eastern side and the House of Representatives want one; Dbeibah and parts of the High Council of State oppose it, because it would end the GNU's mandate before any election.

The US plan answers that question differently. As described by Al Jazeera and Foreign Policy, it would create a 36-month transitional "Government of National Consensus" with Dbeibah remaining in charge of the government and Saddam Haftar, the LNA's deputy commander and Khalifa Haftar's son, as president with executive powers. The incentive is economic: US support for new oil investment once the country is unified. Media aligned with Haftar present it as "the only way to rule and control all of Libyan territory". Critics call it a family bargain. Tarek Megerisi of the European Council on Foreign Relations told Al Jazeera that such a deal "would spell the end of Libyan hopes for elections".

Opposition in the west has been strong. The Presidential Council and the High Council of State have both rejected the plan, and the latter threatened to suspend any member who backed it. Leaders in Misrata, Dbeibah's home city, told Boulos in July that they opposed "any settlement that would preserve the status quo". Dbeibah himself has not committed. The Libya Observer also reports disagreement among Khalifa Haftar's sons over the concentration of power in Saddam's hands. No member of the Security Council has formally endorsed the US design, and Russia has warned against "imposing" solutions.

OIL AND MONEY

The economic news in 2026 is better than the politics. The National Oil Corporation (NOC) reached 1.43 million barrels a day of crude in April and 1.5 million barrels a day including condensate on 21 June. It reported 1.36 million barrels a day of crude for July. The target is 1.6 million by the end of 2026 and 2 million by 2030. Exports run at about 1 million barrels a day, and oil and gas provide around 95% of export and state revenue. With the Strait of Hormuz largely closed, Libyan crude, which does not pass through the Gulf, has gained value for European buyers.

The unified budget matters as much as the output. For more than a decade the two administrations spent through parallel systems, and the division of oil revenue was the most common trigger for blockades of fields and ports. The April budget allocates 12 billion dinars to the NOC for investment. The dinar strengthened from about 9 to under 7 per dollar, and the IMF raised its 2026 growth forecast for Libya to 6.7%. Output figures show no major sustained shutdown so far in 2026.

The risk to that record is in the west. On 11 August the NOC declared "maximum alert" after the drone strikes on Zawiya and warned that it might declare force majeure at the refinery if attacks continued.

SECURITY: ZAWIYA AND THE WESTERN MILITIAS

The government in Tripoli still depends on armed groups that it does not control. Dbeibah's attempt since May 2025 to break the power of the largest Tripoli factions, including Radaa at Mitiga, has produced intermittent fighting in the capital and its suburbs without a clear outcome.

Zawiya, about 47 km west of Tripoli, is now the most violent place in the country. It hosts the country's largest operating refinery and sits on the main fuel smuggling routes to Tunisia. ACLED has recorded more than 30 armed clashes there in 2026, mostly short fights over territory, smuggling and revenge. The main actors named in its reporting are the forces of Mohamed Bahroun, the al-Silaa Brigade of Othman al-Lahab, the al-Nasr Brigade and the Petroleum Facilities Guard led by Mohamed Kashlaf. The 8 May fighting, between Bahroun's men and Kashlaf's guards, closed the refinery. The August drone attacks used small first-person-view drones against storage tanks, including one holding 4.5 million litres of petrol. No group claimed them.

The east is quieter because it is more centralised. Khalifa Haftar's LNA controls Benghazi, Sirte, the oil crescent and most of the south, and his sons hold its key commands. Smuggling networks nonetheless operate in LNA-held territory, including those behind the migrant route to Crete described below. The Global Initiative reports that LNA forces carry out only selective crackdowns.

RUSSIA AND THE SOUTHERN CORRIDOR

After the fall of Assad in December 2024 cost Russia its Syrian hub, Libya became its main logistics base for Africa. Imagery analysis by the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, reported by Africa Defense Forum in August 2026, identified Russian construction or refurbishment at six air bases in LNA-held territory: Al-Jufra, Al-Khadim, Al-Qardabiyah at Sirte, Brak al-Shati, Maaten al-Sarra and Tamanhint. Personnel at Brak al-Shati rose from 300 to 450 by December 2024, and new hangars and barracks have been built at Al-Khadim, east of Benghazi. Maaten al-Sarra, near the borders with Chad and Sudan, was abandoned from 2011 until Russia reopened it in December 2024 using Syrian labour.

These bases connect to the wars to the south. Russia supplies the juntas of the Sahel, whose survival now depends on its Africa Corps. Al-Khadim has been identified as a hub for arms and supplies to Sudan's Rapid Support Forces. Andrew McGregor of the Jamestown Foundation has written that Maaten al-Sarra gives Moscow the "ability to ship arms to Sudanese or Chadian territory quietly". Russia's official support in Sudan has shifted to the army, but its forces in Libya do not appear to interfere with Haftar's supply line to the RSF.

Turkey remains the main military partner of the Tripoli government. On 20 June Egypt hosted the Egyptian, Saudi and Turkish foreign ministers and Boulos for talks on Libya.

MIGRATION: THE ROUTE TO CRETE

The Sudanese war has turned eastern Libya into a major departure point for Europe. UNHCR estimates that about 560,000 Sudanese have entered Libya, many through Kufra, including about 388,000 in 2025 alone. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime reports that arrivals on Crete from eastern Libya rose from 815 in 2023 to 5,161 in 2024 and about 21,000 in 2025, with another 6,000 departures in the first five months of 2026. Crossing prices have fallen from €2,100–3,500 in 2024 to €340–1,450, as smugglers switched to small, locally built boats. At least 397 people died on the route in 2025 and at least 177 in the first months of 2026.

Karim Mezran of the Atlantic Council has argued that migration control is one of the aims of the US plan, and it is a reason European governments are willing to deal with the Haftar family directly. It also gives Benghazi a bargaining chip that it did not have two years ago.

OUTLOOK: WHAT TO WATCH

• Implementation of the 30 August agreement. The first test is whether the new HNEC board is appointed and accepted by both legislatures. The second is whether a date is set before the two-year window closes.
• The fate of the Boulos plan. Dbeibah's decision is the key variable. Accepting would split the western coalition that keeps him in power; rejecting it would risk his relationship with Washington.
• Zawiya and the oil sector. A force majeure at the refinery, or an attack on the Mellitah gas complex further west, would be the first serious disruption to the 2026 production gains.
• Succession in the east. Khalifa Haftar is 82. The contest among his sons, and the wider role of the Haftar family, will decide whether the east remains stable.
• UNSMIL's mandate. It expires at the end of October, and Council members differ on how far the UN should shape the political process.

Libya is closer to a formal settlement than at any time since 2021. The more likely outcome in the near term, though, is an elite arrangement that divides money and offices while the armed groups remain intact, which would reduce the risk of war without ending the fragmentation.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

What is the situation in Libya in September 2026?

Libya is still divided between the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity and an eastern government backed by Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army. On 30 August 2026 the two sides signed a UN-facilitated agreement to reform the election commission and hold elections within two years. Armed clashes continue in western Libya, especially around Zawiya.

Will Libya hold elections?

The 30 August agreement commits the parties to parliamentary and presidential elections within two years, but it does not settle whether a unified interim government will organise them. Libya's last scheduled elections, in December 2021, were postponed indefinitely.

What is the US plan for Libya?

The plan promoted by presidential adviser Massad Boulos would create a 36-month transitional government, with Abdul Hamid Dbeibah as prime minister and Saddam Haftar as president. It is linked to US support for oil investment. It has been rejected by the Presidential Council, the High Council of State and many leaders in western Libya.

Who is Saddam Haftar?

Saddam Haftar is a son of Khalifa Haftar and deputy commander of the Libyan National Army. He met US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in June 2026 and would become president under the US power-sharing plan.

How much oil does Libya produce in 2026?

Libya reached 1.5 million barrels a day of crude and condensate on 21 June 2026, its highest level since 2013. Crude output was 1.36 million barrels a day in July. The National Oil Corporation aims for 1.6 million by the end of 2026.

Why is there fighting in Zawiya?

Zawiya, west of Tripoli, hosts Libya's largest operating refinery and sits on fuel smuggling routes. Rival armed groups fight over territory and the smuggling trade. ACLED recorded more than 30 clashes there in 2026, and drones struck the refinery's storage tanks in August.

What is Russia doing in Libya?

Russia is building or refurbishing facilities at six air bases in Haftar-controlled territory, including Al-Jufra, Al-Khadim and Maaten al-Sarra. The bases support Russian operations in the Sahel and have been linked to supply routes to Sudan's Rapid Support Forces.

How does Libya affect migration to Europe?

Eastern Libya has become the main departure point for boats to Crete. About 21,000 people reached Crete from Libya in 2025, up from 815 in 2023, many of them Sudanese refugees who entered Libya through Kufra.

AUTHOR

SOURCES AND REFERENCES

• UN Security Council – Press statement on Libya (8 September 2026)
• Security Council Report – Libya, August 2026 Monthly Forecast
• Security Council Report – Libya, June 2026 Monthly Forecast
• UNSMIL – Political Roadmap
• Al Jazeera – Oil for unity: what is the US mediation plan in Libya?
• The Libya Observer – Boulos power-sharing deal sparks backlash in Libya
• The National – Libya hits record output and approves first unified budget in 13 years
• National Oil Corporation – Libyan oil production nears 1.5 million barrels a day
• ACLED – Increasing drone attacks on Zawiya risk triggering an oil shutdown
• Africa Defense Forum – Africa Corps work at Libyan air bases raises concerns
• Global Initiative – A smuggling route reawakens: movement surges between eastern Libya and Crete