WHAT CHANGED SINCE APRIL

The April edition of this briefing described a slow erosion of state control across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Within days of its publication, the erosion became a rupture. On 25 April 2026 the al-Qaeda affiliate Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Tuareg-led Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) attacked at least eight Malian cities at the same time and announced their alliance publicly for the first time. It was the largest offensive of the Mali war since the 2012 rebellion.

Since then the conflict in the central Sahel has had three main features. JNIM is waging economic warfare against Bamako instead of trying to storm it. Russia's Africa Corps has been pushed out of parts of the north and has become the last line of defence for the regimes it supports. And the armies of the region are showing internal strain, most visibly in Niger. The Council on Foreign Relations notes that the Liptako-Gourma border zone now accounts for more than half of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide.

10K+
Conflict deaths in 2025 (ACLED)
300+
Fuel tankers destroyed in Mali
2.6M
Displaced in Liptako-Gourma
28 APR
Bamako blockade declared

TIMELINE: SEPTEMBER 2025 TO SEPTEMBER 2026

MALI: A CAPITAL SUPPLIED BY CONVOY

JNIM has not tried to capture Bamako. It has instead cut the roads that feed it. Roadblocks have been reported to the west at Soribougou, to the south-west at Naréna and to the south at Ouélessébougou, and more than 250 vehicles were stranded outside the city on 30 April. More than 300 fuel tankers have been destroyed since September 2025. The government announced nationwide fuel rationing on 22 January, Mopti went more than a month without deliveries, and satellite images show Bamako's night-time lighting has dimmed.

The capital has not fallen because convoys still get through. At least 1,200 tankers reached Bamako under military protection in the weeks after 27 October 2025, mainly from Côte d'Ivoire through Bougouni, and escorted deliveries have continued in 2026. The Malian army disputes the term blockade. Its spokesman, Souleymane Dembele, has called the reporting "information warfare orchestrated by foreign media". The group's own statements describe the 28 April measure as punishment for civilians who helped the army during the offensive.

JNIM also uses the blockade to govern. In October 2025 it lifted its ban on one bus company after the firm agreed to segregate passengers by sex and require women to wear full veils; the government then suspended the company. The demands attached to the blockade have grown from the removal of a fuel tax to the application of sharia law. ACLED describes this as "economic warfare", and it recorded 22 foreign nationals kidnapped in Mali in 2025, many from mines and industrial sites.

The north

The fall of Kidal reversed the junta's main military achievement, the capture of the town from Tuareg rebels in November 2023. The FLA says it captured more than 200 soldiers there. It released 82 prisoners on 13 August and about 60 more in late August in exchange for one of its commanders. The government has answered with air power, including a bombing campaign around Kidal from 27 May that destroyed a mosque, and strikes near Hombori on 15 June that killed seven civilians. Ménaka and the city of Gao remain in government hands, although JNIM's claims to control parts of Gao, Mopti and Sévaré cannot be verified.

ANALYST NOTE

The alliance between JNIM and the FLA joins a jihadist movement with a separatist one. Tuareg separatists and jihadists fought each other in 2012–2013, and their aims still differ: the FLA wants an independent or autonomous Azawad in the north, while JNIM wants Islamic rule across the country. The partnership works while both are fighting Bamako and the Russians. It would come under strain if either began to negotiate separately, which is one reason Algeria's renewed role as a mediator matters.

NIGER: THE COUP ATTEMPT OF 28–29 AUGUST

The mutineers called themselves the Armed Forces for the Restoration of the Fatherland. They were mostly young officers from units based at Ouallam, Téra and Dosso in the south-west, the area where the army is fighting both ISSP and JNIM. Reporting on their grievances points to unequal treatment: the Presidential Guard that protects Tiani has better equipment and safer postings than the frontline units, which have taken heavy losses. About 18 soldiers had been killed in an attack in Dosso region the week before.

The Presidential Guard retook the sites within the day with support from Russian Africa Corps personnel, who used attack drones. At least three guardsmen were killed. One analyst quoted in accounts of the fighting said it was no exaggeration "to say that the Russians saved the day". Algeria sent four Su-30 fighter jets and tanker aircraft to Niamey on 30 August, which Niger described as "strategic support". Dozens of soldiers have been arrested since. Heni Nsaibia of ACLED told NBC News that "the jihadist groups will be the only winners in this situation".

Niger's other pressures have not eased. ISSP has attacked the oil pipeline to Benin, extended its operations into Dosso and northern Agadez, and turned to kidnapping foreigners for ransom. The uranium stockpile at Niamey airport, mined at Arlit by the French company Orano before the junta took over the site, is still awaiting export.

BURKINA FASO AND THE WAR BETWEEN THE JIHADISTS

Burkina Faso has had fewer headline events in 2026, but its position is not better. In 2025 JNIM briefly seized the provincial capitals of Djibo and Diapaga and killed about 90 soldiers in a single ambush near Koubel-Alpha in September, according to the International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch. Captain Ibrahim Traoré's government holds the main cities and relies heavily on civilian auxiliaries, whose abuses against Fulani communities have helped jihadist recruitment.

The most active front on Burkinabè soil is now the war between JNIM and ISSP in the Liptako-Gourma tri-border area. ISSP fighters killed 35 JNIM members at the Pétél Kolé crossing in Niger's Téra department on 6 April. JNIM infiltrators assassinated a senior ISSP figure near the Burkina–Niger border in mid-July, and a JNIM ambush on 17 August reportedly killed ISSP's emir for north-eastern Burkina Faso. In 2026 the two groups have also clashed inside Niger and Nigeria for the first time. Their current priorities differ, with JNIM concentrating on Mali and ISSP on Niger.

RUSSIA, THE ALLIANCE OF SAHEL STATES AND OTHER OUTSIDE POWERS

Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger left ECOWAS in January 2025 and formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with a mutual defence pact. The pact has produced joint air strikes, such as those of 30 April, but no ground force able to relieve a besieged garrison. Each regime's survival rests instead on Africa Corps, the Russian defence ministry formation that replaced Wagner. Africa Corps had at least 400 personnel engaged in the April fighting. Its own claim to have killed more than 1,000 insurgents is not supported by independent evidence. It has withdrawn from the far north under negotiated arrangements, lost aircraft and men in July and September, and has been blamed for an air strike that killed at least eight civilians at Kyrnia on 15 July.

Other powers are adjusting. Turkey supplies the armed drones used by all three armies. Algeria, which fell out with Bamako in 2025, has mediated in Kidal, restored relations with Mali and shown military support for Niger. The United States lifted sanctions on Sadio Camara and two other Malian officials on 27 February, two months before his death, and keeps diplomatic contact with the juntas after losing its bases in Niger. France has advised its nationals to leave Mali.

SPILLOVER TO THE COAST AND NIGERIA

To the east, the routes through Chad and Darfur connect the Sahel to the war described in our Sudan briefing. To the north they run into Libya.

OUTLOOK: WHAT TO WATCH

A jihadist seizure of a Sahelian capital remains unlikely in the short term. The more probable course is further loss of the countryside and the roads, with governments that hold the main cities and little else.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

What is happening in the Sahel in September 2026?

Mali's junta has lost Kidal and other northern towns since a joint JNIM and FLA offensive on 25 April 2026, and Bamako has been under a declared blockade since 28 April. Niger's government survived a coup attempt on 28–29 August. Jihadist attacks continue across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

Is Bamako under siege?

JNIM has blocked the main roads into Bamako and destroyed more than 300 fuel tankers since September 2025. The city is still supplied by armed convoys, mainly from Côte d'Ivoire, so it is under blockade but has not been cut off completely. The Malian army disputes that description.

Who killed Mali's defence minister Sadio Camara?

General Sadio Camara was killed on 25 April 2026 when JNIM detonated a car bomb at his residence in Kati, a garrison town about 15 km from Bamako. President Assimi Goïta took over the defence ministry on 4 May.

What happened in Niger in August 2026?

On 28–29 August a group of officers calling itself the Armed Forces for the Restoration of the Fatherland attacked Niamey's airport, an air base, the presidency and state television. The Presidential Guard, supported by Russian Africa Corps personnel, defeated the attempt within a day. Dozens of soldiers were arrested.

What are JNIM and ISSP?

JNIM is the al-Qaeda affiliate in the Sahel and is strongest in Mali and Burkina Faso. ISSP is the Islamic State's Sahel Province and is strongest in Niger and eastern Mali. They are rivals and have fought each other in the Liptako-Gourma border area throughout 2026.

What is Russia's role in the Sahel?

Africa Corps, a Russian defence ministry force that replaced the Wagner Group, fights alongside the armies of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. It withdrew from Kidal and other northern bases in April 2026 but helped defend Bamako and helped defeat the Niamey mutiny in August.

What is the Alliance of Sahel States?

It is a confederation of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, all ruled by military governments. The three left ECOWAS in January 2025 and signed a mutual defence pact. They have carried out joint air strikes but have no combined ground force.

Is the conflict spreading beyond the Sahel?

Yes. Northern Benin had its deadliest year on record in 2025, JNIM claimed its first attack in Nigeria in October 2025, and attacks on fuel convoys have reached the Senegalese border. ACLED counted more than 10,000 conflict deaths in the three central Sahel states in 2025.

AUTHOR

EDITOR · ENERGY & HYBRID CONFLICT

Arda Alkis is an energy and hybrid conflict analyst specializing in maritime security, strategic chokepoints, and irregular warfare. His work is based on open-source intelligence and data from ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data), the International Crisis Group (ICG), and international reporting networks. He focuses on energy-driven conflicts, proxy warfare, and instability across the Middle East, Africa, and global trade corridors.

Read more about the WarWatch editorial team on the About page.

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