WHAT CHANGED SINCE APRIL
The April edition of this briefing described a slow erosion of state control across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Within days of its publication, the erosion became a rupture. On 25 April 2026 the al-Qaeda affiliate Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Tuareg-led Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) attacked at least eight Malian cities at the same time and announced their alliance publicly for the first time. It was the largest offensive of the Mali war since the 2012 rebellion.
Since then the conflict in the central Sahel has had three main features. JNIM is waging economic warfare against Bamako instead of trying to storm it. Russia's Africa Corps has been pushed out of parts of the north and has become the last line of defence for the regimes it supports. And the armies of the region are showing internal strain, most visibly in Niger. The Council on Foreign Relations notes that the Liptako-Gourma border zone now accounts for more than half of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide.
TIMELINE: SEPTEMBER 2025 TO SEPTEMBER 2026
- 3 September 2025: JNIM announces a fuel blockade of Mali. Mali imports about 95% of its fuel by road from Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire. The first large ambush, on a convoy of 80 tankers under Malian and Russian escort in Kayes region, leaves more than 50 tankers at the site, 30 of them burnt.
- October–November 2025: Schools close nationwide from 26 October to 9 November for lack of fuel. On 28 October the US embassy tells Americans to "depart immediately". Escorted convoys begin to reach Bamako from 30 October.
- 29 January 2026: Gunmen attack Niamey's international airport and the adjoining air base. Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) claims responsibility. About 1,000 tonnes of uranium concentrate stored at the airport are not damaged. Junta leader Abdourahamane Tiani accuses Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and France of sponsoring the attack, without presenting evidence.
- 25 April: The JNIM–FLA offensive hits Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Gao, Bourem, Mopti, Sévaré and Ménaka. A car bomb at his residence in Kati kills Defence Minister Sadio Camara, members of his family and several others.
- 27–28 April: Africa Corps evacuates Kidal under an arrangement mediated by Algeria, and the FLA takes full control of the town. Russian and Malian forces also leave Tessalit, Aguelhok, Ber, Léré and Labbezanga, which ISSP occupies. JNIM declares a total blockade of Bamako.
- 4–8 May: President Assimi Goïta makes himself defence minister. JNIM attacks Kenieroba prison, which holds 2,500 inmates, and kills dozens of villagers in Mopti region on 7–8 May.
- 4–18 July: A second wave of coordinated attacks. The FLA and JNIM take most of Anéfis on 5 July and shoot down a helicopter before Africa Corps retakes the town on 9 July. An attack on a relief convoy in Gao region on 17–18 July kills about 50 Malian and Russian personnel. JNIM drives the army out of Kouakourou.
- 11 July: Mali restores diplomatic relations with Algeria.
- Early August: JNIM attacks the garrison at San in Ségou region. Ten soldiers and about 40 militants are reported killed, and JNIM claims the barracks.
- 28–29 August: Mutinous officers in Niger attack the airport, Base 101, the presidency and state television in Niamey. Loyalist forces regain control within a day.
- 5–10 September: JNIM claims a military post near Bamako, kills several Russian soldiers in an attack confirmed by video, and claims to have killed more than 50 soldiers at the Dioura camp in central Mali.
MALI: A CAPITAL SUPPLIED BY CONVOY
JNIM has not tried to capture Bamako. It has instead cut the roads that feed it. Roadblocks have been reported to the west at Soribougou, to the south-west at Naréna and to the south at Ouélessébougou, and more than 250 vehicles were stranded outside the city on 30 April. More than 300 fuel tankers have been destroyed since September 2025. The government announced nationwide fuel rationing on 22 January, Mopti went more than a month without deliveries, and satellite images show Bamako's night-time lighting has dimmed.
The capital has not fallen because convoys still get through. At least 1,200 tankers reached Bamako under military protection in the weeks after 27 October 2025, mainly from Côte d'Ivoire through Bougouni, and escorted deliveries have continued in 2026. The Malian army disputes the term blockade. Its spokesman, Souleymane Dembele, has called the reporting "information warfare orchestrated by foreign media". The group's own statements describe the 28 April measure as punishment for civilians who helped the army during the offensive.
JNIM also uses the blockade to govern. In October 2025 it lifted its ban on one bus company after the firm agreed to segregate passengers by sex and require women to wear full veils; the government then suspended the company. The demands attached to the blockade have grown from the removal of a fuel tax to the application of sharia law. ACLED describes this as "economic warfare", and it recorded 22 foreign nationals kidnapped in Mali in 2025, many from mines and industrial sites.
The north
The fall of Kidal reversed the junta's main military achievement, the capture of the town from Tuareg rebels in November 2023. The FLA says it captured more than 200 soldiers there. It released 82 prisoners on 13 August and about 60 more in late August in exchange for one of its commanders. The government has answered with air power, including a bombing campaign around Kidal from 27 May that destroyed a mosque, and strikes near Hombori on 15 June that killed seven civilians. Ménaka and the city of Gao remain in government hands, although JNIM's claims to control parts of Gao, Mopti and Sévaré cannot be verified.
The alliance between JNIM and the FLA joins a jihadist movement with a separatist one. Tuareg separatists and jihadists fought each other in 2012–2013, and their aims still differ: the FLA wants an independent or autonomous Azawad in the north, while JNIM wants Islamic rule across the country. The partnership works while both are fighting Bamako and the Russians. It would come under strain if either began to negotiate separately, which is one reason Algeria's renewed role as a mediator matters.
NIGER: THE COUP ATTEMPT OF 28–29 AUGUST
The mutineers called themselves the Armed Forces for the Restoration of the Fatherland. They were mostly young officers from units based at Ouallam, Téra and Dosso in the south-west, the area where the army is fighting both ISSP and JNIM. Reporting on their grievances points to unequal treatment: the Presidential Guard that protects Tiani has better equipment and safer postings than the frontline units, which have taken heavy losses. About 18 soldiers had been killed in an attack in Dosso region the week before.
The Presidential Guard retook the sites within the day with support from Russian Africa Corps personnel, who used attack drones. At least three guardsmen were killed. One analyst quoted in accounts of the fighting said it was no exaggeration "to say that the Russians saved the day". Algeria sent four Su-30 fighter jets and tanker aircraft to Niamey on 30 August, which Niger described as "strategic support". Dozens of soldiers have been arrested since. Heni Nsaibia of ACLED told NBC News that "the jihadist groups will be the only winners in this situation".
Niger's other pressures have not eased. ISSP has attacked the oil pipeline to Benin, extended its operations into Dosso and northern Agadez, and turned to kidnapping foreigners for ransom. The uranium stockpile at Niamey airport, mined at Arlit by the French company Orano before the junta took over the site, is still awaiting export.
BURKINA FASO AND THE WAR BETWEEN THE JIHADISTS
Burkina Faso has had fewer headline events in 2026, but its position is not better. In 2025 JNIM briefly seized the provincial capitals of Djibo and Diapaga and killed about 90 soldiers in a single ambush near Koubel-Alpha in September, according to the International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch. Captain Ibrahim Traoré's government holds the main cities and relies heavily on civilian auxiliaries, whose abuses against Fulani communities have helped jihadist recruitment.
The most active front on Burkinabè soil is now the war between JNIM and ISSP in the Liptako-Gourma tri-border area. ISSP fighters killed 35 JNIM members at the Pétél Kolé crossing in Niger's Téra department on 6 April. JNIM infiltrators assassinated a senior ISSP figure near the Burkina–Niger border in mid-July, and a JNIM ambush on 17 August reportedly killed ISSP's emir for north-eastern Burkina Faso. In 2026 the two groups have also clashed inside Niger and Nigeria for the first time. Their current priorities differ, with JNIM concentrating on Mali and ISSP on Niger.
RUSSIA, THE ALLIANCE OF SAHEL STATES AND OTHER OUTSIDE POWERS
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger left ECOWAS in January 2025 and formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with a mutual defence pact. The pact has produced joint air strikes, such as those of 30 April, but no ground force able to relieve a besieged garrison. Each regime's survival rests instead on Africa Corps, the Russian defence ministry formation that replaced Wagner. Africa Corps had at least 400 personnel engaged in the April fighting. Its own claim to have killed more than 1,000 insurgents is not supported by independent evidence. It has withdrawn from the far north under negotiated arrangements, lost aircraft and men in July and September, and has been blamed for an air strike that killed at least eight civilians at Kyrnia on 15 July.
Other powers are adjusting. Turkey supplies the armed drones used by all three armies. Algeria, which fell out with Bamako in 2025, has mediated in Kidal, restored relations with Mali and shown military support for Niger. The United States lifted sanctions on Sadio Camara and two other Malian officials on 27 February, two months before his death, and keeps diplomatic contact with the juntas after losing its bases in Niger. France has advised its nationals to leave Mali.
SPILLOVER TO THE COAST AND NIGERIA
- Benin: 2025 was the deadliest year on record in the northern departments of Atacora and Alibori. JNIM killed more than 50 soldiers in one attack in Park W and had moved south into Borgou by mid-2025.
- Nigeria: JNIM claimed its first attack in Nigeria in late October 2025. ACLED warns that the Sahelian and Nigerian theatres are merging into a single conflict zone.
- Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire: Both are exposed through the fuel corridors. JNIM has kidnapped Senegalese drivers and ambushed a convoy near the Senegalese border, killing at least 15 people in January.
- Displacement: About 2.6 million people are displaced in Liptako-Gourma and 2.8 million in the Lake Chad Basin.
To the east, the routes through Chad and Darfur connect the Sahel to the war described in our Sudan briefing. To the north they run into Libya.
OUTLOOK: WHAT TO WATCH
- Bamako's fuel supply. The capital can function for as long as the convoys run. A sustained interruption of the Ivorian route would be the most serious threat the junta has faced.
- Cohesion of the armies. The Niamey mutiny came from frontline units. Similar grievances exist in Mali and Burkina Faso, and both governments have reported coup plots in the past two years.
- Russian staying power. Africa Corps is taking losses while Russia is still fighting in Ukraine. Any reduction would leave the juntas without a replacement.
- Negotiation. JNIM has reached local agreements with communities and companies. Whether any of the three governments opens talks, directly or through Algeria, is the main political question for the rest of 2026.
A jihadist seizure of a Sahelian capital remains unlikely in the short term. The more probable course is further loss of the countryside and the roads, with governments that hold the main cities and little else.
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
What is happening in the Sahel in September 2026?
Mali's junta has lost Kidal and other northern towns since a joint JNIM and FLA offensive on 25 April 2026, and Bamako has been under a declared blockade since 28 April. Niger's government survived a coup attempt on 28–29 August. Jihadist attacks continue across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
Is Bamako under siege?
JNIM has blocked the main roads into Bamako and destroyed more than 300 fuel tankers since September 2025. The city is still supplied by armed convoys, mainly from Côte d'Ivoire, so it is under blockade but has not been cut off completely. The Malian army disputes that description.
Who killed Mali's defence minister Sadio Camara?
General Sadio Camara was killed on 25 April 2026 when JNIM detonated a car bomb at his residence in Kati, a garrison town about 15 km from Bamako. President Assimi Goïta took over the defence ministry on 4 May.
What happened in Niger in August 2026?
On 28–29 August a group of officers calling itself the Armed Forces for the Restoration of the Fatherland attacked Niamey's airport, an air base, the presidency and state television. The Presidential Guard, supported by Russian Africa Corps personnel, defeated the attempt within a day. Dozens of soldiers were arrested.
What are JNIM and ISSP?
JNIM is the al-Qaeda affiliate in the Sahel and is strongest in Mali and Burkina Faso. ISSP is the Islamic State's Sahel Province and is strongest in Niger and eastern Mali. They are rivals and have fought each other in the Liptako-Gourma border area throughout 2026.
What is Russia's role in the Sahel?
Africa Corps, a Russian defence ministry force that replaced the Wagner Group, fights alongside the armies of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. It withdrew from Kidal and other northern bases in April 2026 but helped defend Bamako and helped defeat the Niamey mutiny in August.
What is the Alliance of Sahel States?
It is a confederation of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, all ruled by military governments. The three left ECOWAS in January 2025 and signed a mutual defence pact. They have carried out joint air strikes but have no combined ground force.
Is the conflict spreading beyond the Sahel?
Yes. Northern Benin had its deadliest year on record in 2025, JNIM claimed its first attack in Nigeria in October 2025, and attacks on fuel convoys have reached the Senegalese border. ACLED counted more than 10,000 conflict deaths in the three central Sahel states in 2025.
AUTHOR
Arda Alkis is an energy and hybrid conflict analyst specializing in maritime security, strategic chokepoints, and irregular warfare. His work is based on open-source intelligence and data from ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data), the International Crisis Group (ICG), and international reporting networks. He focuses on energy-driven conflicts, proxy warfare, and instability across the Middle East, Africa, and global trade corridors.
Read more about the WarWatch editorial team on the About page.
SOURCES AND REFERENCES
- ACLED – Economic warfare escalates as militants expand beyond the Sahel
- Council on Foreign Relations – Violent Extremism in the Sahel (Global Conflict Tracker)
- Al Jazeera – Mali's Defence Minister Sadio Camara killed during coordinated attacks
- The Africa Report – Killing of Sadio Camara brings Mali's pro-Russian strategy to a bloody halt
- NBC News – Rival factions stand off in Niger capital after mutineers attack airport, presidency
- Al Jazeera – Niger's military-led government says it contained mutiny: what next?
- Africanews – Dozens of soldiers arrested in Niger after attempted mutiny
- Bloomberg – Niger attack endangered uranium stockpile near main airport
- International Crisis Group – Burkina Faso
- Human Rights Watch – World Report 2026: Burkina Faso
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