WHAT CHANGED SINCE APRIL
The April edition of this briefing described al-Shabaab as a resilient insurgency sustaining long-term asymmetric warfare. That remains true, but the political context has worsened sharply. The president's four-year term expired on 15 May 2026. He argues that constitutional amendments passed in March extended it to five years; the opposition, Puntland and Jubaland say his mandate has ended. On 4 June government forces and opposition militias fought in Mogadishu. In August, Puntland forces took a federal military camp near Galkayo.
At the same time the international support that has kept Mogadishu secure is weakening. On 1 July Washington said it would end its roughly $500 million a year in logistical support for the African Union mission from 31 December. Israel's recognition of the breakaway region of Somaliland in December 2025 has added a new regional dispute. And with navies stretched by the Red Sea and Hormuz crises, pirates have returned to the Gulf of Aden.
TIMELINE: 2025 TO SEPTEMBER 2026
- January 2025: The African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) replaces ATMIS with an authorised strength of up to 11,911 personnel. Puntland launches a major offensive against Islamic State–Somalia in the Cal Miskaad mountains, supported by US air strikes.
- February–May 2025: Al-Shabaab launches an offensive in Middle Shabelle and recaptures most of the territory it lost there since 2022, including the town of Adan Yabaal. On 18 March a roadside bomb targets the president's convoy in Mogadishu.
- October 2025: A car bomb disguised as a military vehicle strikes an intelligence service facility near the presidential palace, freeing dozens of prisoners.
- 26 December 2025: Israel becomes the first UN member state to recognise Somaliland. Somalia calls it an attack on its sovereignty, and the UN Security Council holds an emergency session on 29 December.
- 12 January 2026: Somalia cancels its security and port agreements with the UAE.
- January–March: Al-Shabaab attacks four military bases in Middle Shabelle on 18 January. On 1 March Somali and Ugandan AUSSOM forces launch "Operation Rolling Thunder" in Lower Shabelle.
- March: Parliament approves constitutional amendments that introduce direct elections and extend presidential and parliamentary terms from four to five years. Puntland and Jubaland reject them.
- 15–21 May: The president's original term expires. He says his mandate runs to 15 May 2027. Puntland declares that federal mandates have ended.
- 4 June: Fighting breaks out in Mogadishu between government forces and militias loyal to opposition leaders, including former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and former Prime Minister Hassan Khayre.
- 1 July: The US announces it will end funding for logistical support to AUSSOM through the UN support office (UNSOS) from 31 December 2026.
- 5 August: Puntland forces seize a federal military camp near Galkayo.
- 17–20 August: Pirates hijack the MV Lutuf and then the tanker Sibu 1 off Yemen, the fifth and sixth hijackings since 21 April.
AL-SHABAAB: BACK FROM THE 2022 OFFENSIVE
In 2022 the government, with clan militias and AU support, drove al-Shabaab out of much of Hiraan and Middle Shabelle. That campaign has now largely been reversed. The group's 2025 offensive retook Adan Yabaal and most of the Middle Shabelle towns it had lost. The Africa Defense Forum reported in January that al-Shabaab controls about 30% of Somalia and runs checkpoints on the outskirts of the capital. A senior Somali general said that between 10,000 and 15,000 soldiers had been killed or wounded in three years.
The group combines rural control with attacks inside Mogadishu: the March 2025 bomb aimed at the president's convoy, the first such attack since 2014, and the October 2025 car bomb near the presidential palace. Matt Bryden of the Sahan research group has described Mogadishu as "a metropolis with a diplomatic corps and a demoralized, ineffectual army" and warned that al-Shabaab's seizure of the city "may already be simply a matter of time". That is a minority view. Most analysts expect a stalemate, and government and AU forces still hold the capital and major towns. But the trend since 2025 has favoured the insurgents.
Al-Shabaab's finances remain strong. It taxes trade and farming in areas it controls and extorts businesses in government-held cities, including Mogadishu. Islamic State–Somalia, a much smaller group, has been pushed out of key bases in Puntland's Cal Miskaad mountains by Puntland forces and US air strikes but has not been eliminated.
Somalia's political crisis and its security crisis are the same crisis. Puntland and Jubaland have some of the most capable forces in the country, and both are now in open dispute with Mogadishu. Federal troops that could be fighting al-Shabaab were deployed against opposition militias in the capital in June and against Jubaland at Ras Kamboni in 2024. Each round of political conflict gives al-Shabaab room to regroup.
THE MANDATE CRISIS
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has pursued a move from Somalia's clan-based indirect elections to one-person, one-vote polls, which the country has not held nationally since 1969. Direct voting has been introduced in parts of the country, with local polls held in 2025 and 2026. The constitutional amendments passed in March 2026 also extended terms by a year and, according to critics, strengthened presidential powers.
The opposition, led by figures including Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni and former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, rejects the extension and wants a return to a negotiated, consensus-based electoral model. On 4 June, after both sides deployed forces in Mogadishu ahead of planned protests, fighting broke out. The Defence Ministry said security forces had "neutralized armed militia members" who attacked police; Sharif said government forces had "encircled and attacked my house", and Khayre accused the authorities of using anti-tank weapons and drones. Similar fighting in April 2021, over a two-year extension, split the security forces along clan lines before the extension was withdrawn.
The federal member states are drifting further from Mogadishu. Puntland no longer recognises the federal institutions. Jubaland, whose president Ahmed Madobe defeated a federal attempt to remove him at Ras Kamboni in December 2024, has suspended dialogue. Puntland's seizure of a federal camp near Galkayo on 5 August was the most serious armed clash between Puntland and federal forces this year.
AUSSOM AND THE FUNDING CLIFF
AUSSOM, the successor to the AU's earlier missions, has about 12,000 personnel from Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Egypt. It has never been fully funded. By April 2025 less than 20% of the money required for its first six months had been raised, and the EU's April 2026 contribution was a limited top-up. The US decision to end its roughly $500 million a year in logistical support through UNSOS from 31 December 2026 threatens the mission's ability to supply and move its troops. ACLED's analysts warn that "an abrupt degradation of African Union positions will trigger an immediate, destabilizing security vacuum across central and southern Somalia."
The Somali army is not ready to take over. Its units are uneven in quality, often organised along clan lines, and dependent on foreign pay, training and air support. Türkiye, Qatar, the UAE and the United States have each trained parts of the force. Somalia's break with the UAE in January removed one of those partners, and in February it signed a military cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia.
SOMALILAND AND THE RED SEA
Somaliland, in the north-west, has governed itself since 1991 but had never been recognised by any UN member until Israel's decision on 26 December 2025. The two agreed to exchange embassies, and Israel's foreign minister visited in January. Somalia and many African and Arab states condemned the move. Somaliland controls the port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden, close to the Bab el-Mandeb, which has given the recognition strategic weight during the Red Sea crisis. Ethiopia, which signed a controversial memorandum with Somaliland in 2024 over sea access, is watching closely.
THE RETURN OF PIRACY
Somali piracy, which peaked around 2011 and was largely suppressed by naval patrols and armed guards, has returned. Six commercial vessels have been hijacked since 21 April 2026, most recently the Lutuf on 17 August and the Eritrean-flagged tanker Sibu 1 on 20 August, about 136 nautical miles east of Mukalla in Yemen. Several attacks have taken place off the Yemeni coast, far from Somalia. Analysts attribute the rise to naval forces being stretched by the Red Sea and Hormuz crises and to instability onshore, particularly in Puntland, where many pirate groups are based.
OUTLOOK: WHAT TO WATCH
- The AUSSOM funding gap. Whether the EU, Gulf states or others replace US support before 31 December will decide whether the mission can hold its positions in 2027.
- A deal on the mandate. An agreement between the president and the opposition on an electoral model would reduce the risk of fighting in Mogadishu. Further clashes could split the security forces as in 2021.
- Al-Shabaab around Mogadishu. Attacks on the approaches to the capital, or a major assault inside it, would test whether government forces can hold without AU support.
- Puntland and Jubaland. Further clashes with federal forces would deepen the fragmentation of the Somali state.
- Piracy. Whether naval forces return to the Gulf of Aden, and whether shipping companies restore armed guards, will decide if piracy remains a local problem or grows further.
Somalia is at its most fragile point since al-Shabaab was driven out of Mogadishu in 2011. The insurgency is not yet able to take the capital, but the political and financial foundations that have held it back are weakening at the same time.
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
How strong is al-Shabaab in 2026?
Al-Shabaab recovered most of the territory it lost in central Somalia after its 2025 offensive and is estimated to control about 30% of the country, with checkpoints on the outskirts of Mogadishu. It continues to carry out attacks in the capital, although government and AU forces still hold the city and major towns.
Why is there a political crisis in Somalia?
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's four-year term expired on 15 May 2026. He says constitutional amendments passed in March extended it to 2027. The opposition, Puntland and Jubaland reject the extension, and government forces clashed with opposition militias in Mogadishu on 4 June 2026.
What is AUSSOM?
The African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia is a force of about 12,000 personnel from Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Egypt that began in January 2025. It faces a funding crisis after the US said it would end logistical support from 31 December 2026.
Is the US still involved in Somalia?
The US has continued air strikes against al-Shabaab and Islamic State–Somalia, but on 1 July 2026 it announced it would stop funding logistical support for the AU mission, worth about $500 million a year, from the end of 2026.
Has any country recognised Somaliland?
Yes. On 26 December 2025 Israel became the first UN member state to recognise Somaliland, which has governed itself since 1991. Somalia rejected the decision as an attack on its sovereignty.
Is Somali piracy back?
Yes. Six commercial vessels have been hijacked since 21 April 2026, including the tanker Sibu 1 off Yemen on 20 August. Analysts link the resurgence to naval forces being stretched by the Red Sea and Hormuz crises.
What is happening in Puntland and Jubaland?
Both federal member states reject the 2026 constitutional amendments. Puntland no longer recognises the federal institutions and its forces seized a federal military camp near Galkayo on 5 August 2026. Jubaland has suspended dialogue with Mogadishu.
Could al-Shabaab take Mogadishu?
Some analysts warn it could if AU support collapses and the political crisis deepens. Most expect a continued stalemate, but the balance has shifted towards al-Shabaab since 2025.
AUTHOR
Arda Alkis is an energy and hybrid conflict analyst specializing in maritime security, strategic chokepoints, and irregular warfare. His work is based on open-source intelligence and data from ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data), the International Crisis Group (ICG), and international reporting networks. He focuses on energy-driven conflicts, proxy warfare, and instability across the Middle East, Africa, and global trade corridors.
Read more about the WarWatch editorial team on the About page.
SOURCES AND REFERENCES
- ACLED – What does the US funding exit from UNSOS mean for Somalia's stability?
- CTC Sentinel – Somalia at a Crossroads: resurgent insurgents and the future of AUSSOM
- Africa Defense Forum – Analyst: al-Shabaab seizure of Mogadishu may be a 'matter of time'
- International Crisis Group – New Chapter, Same Stalemate: Somalia's War with Al-Shabaab
- UPI – Violence erupts in Somalia's capital over president's extended term
- Africa at LSE – Somalia is about to enter a constitutional crisis
- Horn Review – Puntland's stand and the crisis of political legitimacy in Somalia
- CNN – Israel becomes first country to formally recognize Somaliland
- Al Jazeera – Gunmen seize tanker off Yemen amid resurgence of Somali piracy
- Cyprus Shipping News – The SIBU 1 hijacking and the Somali piracy resurgence
- Council on Foreign Relations – Conflict with Al-Shabaab in Somalia
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