WHAT CHANGED SINCE APRIL
The April edition of this briefing described Myanmar as a country fragmenting into rival zones, with the military junta slowly losing ground. That picture was drawn from the resistance offensives of 2023 and 2024, when ethnic armed groups captured Lashio, the headquarters of the army's North-Eastern Command, and most of Rakhine State. Since then the balance has shifted back.
China brokered ceasefires that returned Lashio and other towns to the army. The military introduced conscription, rebuilt its forces and adopted large-scale drone warfare. It held a three-phase general election between December 2025 and January 2026 and moved from direct military rule to a nominally civilian government led by the same general. An analysis in Asia Times in July described the armed resistance as being at "five minutes to midnight". Resistance forces and ethnic armies are still estimated to hold about 42% of the country's territory, but they are losing more ground than they are taking.
TIMELINE: 2025 TO SEPTEMBER 2026
- March–April 2025: The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) agrees a China-mediated ceasefire and withdraws from Lashio, which it had captured in 2024. A magnitude 7.7 earthquake centred near Mandalay on 28 March kills thousands.
- July–October 2025: The army retakes Nawnghkio, Kyaukme and Hsipaw from the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). On 27–28 October, at talks in Kunming mediated by China's special envoy Deng Xijun, the TNLA agrees a ceasefire and to hand back Mogoke and Momeik in exchange for an end to air strikes on its territory.
- 28 December 2025 – 25 January 2026: A general election is held in three phases in 102, 100 and 60 townships, with official turnout between 52% and 56%. Voting does not take place in large parts of the country held by the resistance. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) wins a sweeping majority.
- First half of 2026: The army reopens the highway from Mandalay to the Chinese border and the road to Myitkyina, recaptures Falam, Tedim and Tonzang in Chin State, and secures the Asian Highway from Hpa-an to the Thai border at Myawaddy.
- 30 March: The National Unity Government (NUG) and the Kachin, Karen, Chin and Karenni armed organisations announce the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF), a joint political and military council.
- 3–10 April: The new parliament elects Min Aung Hlaing president with 429 votes. He is sworn in on 10 April with a 34-member government.
- June: The Arakan Army (AA) encircles the naval station at Kyaukphyu and repels an army offensive on the Rakhine–Magway border.
- First half of 2026: ACLED records more than a dozen mass killings of civilians, with over 450 deaths, after the military reorganised its command structure in March.
- 4–9 September: The army launches "Operation 4926" to retake ground from the Arakan Army around Sittwe. According to local media, the offensive stalls within five days after columns are driven back with heavy losses.
HOW THE MILITARY RECOVERED
China's intervention
The single most important change has been China's role. Beijing has economic interests in northern Shan State and Rakhine, including oil and gas pipelines and the planned deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu, and it wanted border trade restored. It pressured the MNDAA and TNLA, which operate along its border and depend on Chinese markets, into ceasefires that returned Lashio, Mogoke and Momeik to the army. The Asia Times analysis says China has "effectively neutered" those groups and provides an "unstinting backstop" to the military's operations.
Manpower and drones
The conscription law activated in February 2024 has brought more than 100,000 new recruits into the army. The recruits are poorly trained and the scheme is deeply unpopular. A retired colonel told Asia Times that conscript units are known in the barracks as "the units that don't come back". But the numbers have allowed the army to hold more fronts at once. The military has also adopted drones on a large scale. The Myanmar Peace Monitor recorded 55 drone strike events in the first eight weeks of 2026, 40 of them by the junta, most against civilian targets.
Air power
The air force remains the army's decisive advantage. Air strikes on schools, hospitals, monasteries and displacement camps have killed thousands of people over the past year, according to the UN, and the military now also uses paramotors and gyrocopters for bombing.
The military's recovery follows a clear sequence: neutralise the groups on the Chinese border through Beijing, reopen the trade routes that fund the state, and then take on the remaining resistance one front at a time. The weakness of the plan is manpower. Conscripts can hold roads but have not yet shown they can defeat experienced ethnic armies in their home terrain, as the September setback in Rakhine illustrates.
THE ELECTION AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT
The military presented the 2025–26 election as a return to civilian rule. It was held under the military-drafted 2008 constitution, which reserves a quarter of parliamentary seats for the armed forces, and without the National League for Democracy, which the junta had dissolved. Aung San Suu Kyi remains in detention. Voting was cancelled in dozens of townships because of fighting, and the three phases covered 262 townships in total, out of 330.
The USDP and military-aligned parties dominated the result. On 3 April an electoral college chose Min Aung Hlaing as president, with Nyo Saw and Nan Ni Ni Aye as vice-presidents. The practical effect has been to give the same leadership a new constitutional form, and to offer neighbouring governments a reason to resume normal relations. Critics, including Western governments and human rights groups, describe the vote as a charade.
THE RESISTANCE: A NEW COUNCIL UNDER PRESSURE
The resistance's response to the military's gains was the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF), announced on 30 March. It brings together the NUG and the Kachin Independence Organisation, Karen National Union, Chin National Front and Karenni National Progressive Party. It gives ethnic armed groups operational military authority in their areas while providing a platform for joint planning. Writing for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, analysts argued that the resistance is "more organized, more experienced and more politically aligned than at any point since the 2021 coup".
Others are less optimistic. The Asia Times analysis argues that without a unified command and a national strategy by the end of 2026, the resistance risks defeat front by front. It notes that in five years of war no military leader with national standing has emerged. The People's Defence Forces loyal to the NUG remain dispersed and short of heavy weapons, and the loss of Chinese-border allies has cut an important supply route.
RAKHINE: THE ARAKAN ARMY HOLDS
Rakhine State is the main exception to the military's advance. The Arakan Army took most of the state in 2024 and early 2025. Three townships remain outside its control: the state capital Sittwe, the port of Kyaukphyu and the island of Manaung. In June 2026 the AA encircled the Kyaukphyu naval station, which houses the Dhanyawadi Naval Headquarters and several battalions, and repelled an army offensive on the Rakhine–Magway border, reportedly killing 30 soldiers and capturing more than 20.
The army's "Operation 4926", launched on 4 September, sent columns from the Sittwe area towards Ponnagyun. Local media report that it had stalled by 9 September after two columns were driven back despite air, artillery and drone support. The Arakan Army's position is complicated by its relationship with the Rohingya Muslim minority. Rohingya communities have been caught between the two sides, and junta air strikes on displacement sites in Rakhine have caused mass flight.
Kyaukphyu matters beyond Myanmar. It is the terminus of Chinese oil and gas pipelines and the site of a planned Chinese-funded deep-sea port. Beijing's interest in the port gives it a stake in the outcome of the fighting there.
THE HUMANITARIAN PICTURE
More than 3.6 million people are displaced inside Myanmar, according to the UN, which is focusing its 2026 response on 2.6 million people with the most severe needs. The 2026 humanitarian plan asks for $890 million. Amnesty International reported in January, on the fifth anniversary of the coup, that military atrocities were increasing. The economy has contracted sharply since 2021, and conscription has driven many young men to flee to Thailand or to resistance areas.
OUTLOOK: WHAT TO WATCH
- The dry season. The monsoon ends in October. The military is likely to use the dry season for offensives in Kachin State towards Bhamo and in Karenni and Chin areas.
- Rakhine. Whether the army can hold Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, and whether the Arakan Army moves beyond Rakhine into Magway and Bago, will decide the western front.
- SCEF in practice. A joint command with regular in-person coordination, and not only political statements, would be the first sign that the resistance can reverse the trend.
- China's calculations. Beijing has backed the military to restore stability on its border. Its approach to the Arakan Army and Kyaukphyu is the key open question.
- ASEAN. The regional bloc's Five-Point Consensus of 2021 has not been implemented. How far members normalise relations with the new government will shape Naypyidaw's international position.
The most likely course for the next year is continued military advances in the centre and north, a hard contest in Rakhine, and no negotiated settlement. The war has not ended, but the prospect of a resistance victory that seemed real in 2024 has receded.
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
What is the situation in Myanmar's civil war in September 2026?
The military has regained the initiative since 2025, retaking towns and highways in Shan, Chin, Kachin and Karen areas with Chinese diplomatic support. The resistance still holds about 42% of the territory. In Rakhine State the Arakan Army repelled a major army offensive in September 2026.
Who is the president of Myanmar?
Min Aung Hlaing, the general who led the 2021 coup, was elected president by the new parliament on 3 April 2026 and sworn in on 10 April, after a military-run general election held in three phases between December 2025 and January 2026.
Was Myanmar's 2025–2026 election free and fair?
No. It was held under military rule, without the dissolved National League for Democracy, while Aung San Suu Kyi remained in detention, and voting did not take place in many conflict areas. The military-backed USDP won a large majority. Critics describe it as a charade designed to legitimise military rule.
What is the SCEF?
The Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union was announced on 30 March 2026. It unites the National Unity Government with the Kachin, Karen, Chin and Karenni armed organisations to coordinate political and military strategy against the junta.
Why did the Myanmar military regain ground?
China pressed the MNDAA and TNLA, which operate on its border, into ceasefires that returned Lashio, Mogoke and Momeik to the army. The military also conscripted more than 100,000 new soldiers since 2024 and expanded its use of drones and air strikes.
Does the Arakan Army control Rakhine State?
The Arakan Army controls most of Rakhine State. The state capital Sittwe, the port of Kyaukphyu and Manaung island remain outside its control. It has encircled the Kyaukphyu naval base, and an army offensive launched on 4 September 2026 stalled within days.
How many people are displaced in Myanmar?
More than 3.6 million people are displaced inside Myanmar, according to the UN. Air and drone strikes on civilian sites continue, and ACLED recorded over 450 civilians killed in mass killings in the first half of 2026.
What is China's role in the Myanmar war?
China mediated the ceasefires with the MNDAA and TNLA and supports the military government diplomatically and economically. It has major interests in Myanmar, including pipelines to Yunnan and the planned deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu in Rakhine State.
AUTHOR
Kasim Kasimoglu is a geopolitical and military systems analyst focusing on conventional warfare, force posture, and nuclear deterrence. His analysis integrates open-source intelligence with structured military assessment frameworks, drawing on reporting from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and national defense ministries. His work centers on state-level conflicts across Europe and the Indo-Pacific, with an emphasis on operational dynamics and strategic balance.
Read more about the WarWatch editorial team on the About page.
SOURCES AND REFERENCES
- Asia Times – Crunch time looms over Myanmar's grinding civil war (July 2026)
- FDD – New resistance alliance built to win Myanmar's civil war
- 2026 Myanmar presidential election – results
- US-ASEAN Business Council – Myanmar holds general elections in three phases
- The Irrawaddy – TNLA signs truce with junta, agrees to return Mogoke, Mongmit
- Mizzima – Arakan Army intensifies siege of Sittwe and Kyaukphyu
- Shan Herald Agency for News – Junta's Operation 4926 stalls
- NBC News – Myanmar military escalates civilian killings, monitor warns
- Myanmar Peace Monitor – Junta drone strikes continue to rise across Myanmar
- Amnesty International – Junta atrocities surge five years since coup
- United Nations in Myanmar – Humanitarian Update No. 44
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