Kashmir and India–Pakistan 2026: A Quiet LoC, a Warship Collision and the Indus Waters Ruling

WHAT CHANGED SINCE APRIL

The April edition of this briefing described the Line of Control (LoC) as a "managed but never resolved" frontline. That remains accurate for the LoC itself, where firing has been rare since May 2025. What has changed is the spread of the confrontation to other domains. The dispute over the Indus rivers has moved to international arbitration. The two navies have now made physical contact. Pakistan has turned its 2025 defence pact with Saudi Arabia into a three-way alliance that includes Türkiye. And there is still no political dialogue and no restored trade.

The May 2025 conflict also changed the rules of escalation. India showed it would strike deep inside Pakistan in response to a terrorist attack, and Pakistan showed it would retaliate. Both claimed victory. The next crisis is likely to start where the last one ended.

TIMELINE: APRIL 2025 TO SEPTEMBER 2026

• 22 April 2025: Gunmen kill 26 people, mostly Hindu tourists, at Pahalgam in Kashmir. India blames Pakistan, suspends the Indus Waters Treaty, closes the Attari crossing and expels diplomats. Pakistan denies involvement, closes its airspace to Indian airlines and suspends trade.
• 7–10 May 2025: India launches Operation Sindoor, striking nine sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Four days of air, missile, drone and artillery exchanges follow before a ceasefire on 10 May, which the US says it brokered.
• September 2025: Saudi Arabia and Pakistan sign a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement.
• November 2025: An attack in New Delhi, the first in the capital in years, raises fears of a new crisis.
• 20 February 2026: A brief small-arms exchange at Nowgam sector in Kupwara, one of the few LoC violations reported since the ceasefire. No casualties are reported.
• March 2026: India says the Indus treaty will remain in abeyance until Pakistan ends support for terrorism. Pakistan asks the Court of Arbitration in The Hague to rule on the treaty's status.
• 10 May: On the anniversary of the conflict, Pakistan's army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, warns that any future Indian "misadventure" would bring "extremely widespread, dangerous, far-reaching and painful" consequences.
• June–July: Protests in Pakistan-administered Kashmir over reserved legislative seats lead to deadly clashes, a ban on the Joint Awami Action Committee and long internet shutdowns.
• 7 August: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye sign the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement.
• 1 September: The five-member Court of Arbitration rules unanimously that the Indus Waters Treaty "remains fully in force" and that India "must observe its obligations". India calls the court "illegally constituted".
• 15–16 September: The Indian destroyer INS Kolkata and the Pakistani vessel PNS Hunain collide in the Arabian Sea. Each side summons the other's diplomat. Security forces kill two suspected Jaish-e-Mohammed militants in Udhampur on 16–17 September.

THE LINE OF CONTROL AFTER THE WAR

The LoC, about 740 km long, has been unusually quiet since the ceasefire of 10 May 2025. Reported violations in 2026 have been few and brief, such as the exchange at Nowgam in February, and both armies have avoided the artillery duels that were common before the 2021 ceasefire understanding. This calm reflects deterrence more than trust. Both sides are aware that a serious incident on the LoC could now lead quickly to air and missile strikes.

The militant threat has shifted south. According to ACLED, more than 60% of militant violence in Jammu and Kashmir in 2025 took place in the Jammu division, compared with 5% in 2018. The forests and mountains of the Pir Panjal range, in Poonch and Rajouri, and the Chenab valley districts of Doda and Kishtwar, favour small groups able to stage ambushes and evade long operations. Kathua has seen one of the largest increases in militancy of any district. ACLED also found that the ratio of militants to security forces killed has narrowed from about 5:1 in 2019 to 3:1 by 2025, and that attacks deliberately targeting Hindus and non-Kashmiris have increased. The September operation in Udhampur fits this pattern.

Politics in Jammu and Kashmir

Jammu and Kashmir has had an elected government since October 2024, led by Chief Minister Omar Abdullah of the National Conference. It remains a union territory, with security controlled by New Delhi. On 17 September Abdullah again demanded the restoration of statehood, saying the government had received only "verbal assurances". He argues that statehood is the necessary base for any restoration of the region's special status, removed in 2019.

THE INDUS WATERS DISPUTE

The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty gives India control of the three eastern rivers and Pakistan most of the flow of the western rivers, the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, on which much of Pakistan's agriculture depends. It survived three wars. India placed it "in abeyance" after the Pahalgam attack, the first time either side had suspended it. India had already stopped sharing river-flow data and blocked site inspections from 2023, and the Permanent Indus Commission last met in 2022.

The Court of Arbitration's ruling on 1 September rejected every ground India had offered for suspending the treaty, including cross-border terrorism, sovereignty, population growth and climate change. India did not take part in the hearings in April and says it does not recognise the court. Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said in August that "every single drop of Pakistan's water is our red line". India's ability to stop the western rivers is limited in the short term because its dams on them are mainly run-of-river projects with little storage, about 1 million acre-feet on the Chenab according to Al Jazeera. The danger lies in timing: small changes to flows during the sowing season, or new storage projects, could have large effects downstream.

AT SEA: THE 15 SEPTEMBER COLLISION

On 15 September the Indian guided-missile destroyer Kolkata and the Pakistani vessel Hunain, which was taking part in Pakistan's SEASPARK-26 exercise, collided in the Arabian Sea. India says its ship was on routine surveillance in international waters when the Pakistani ship approached at high speed and crossed its bow. Pakistan says the Indian destroyer had tried repeatedly since 7 September to enter the exercise area and made a dangerous course change. The Pakistani ship returned to port with hull damage. Both governments summoned each other's diplomats on 16 September and accused each other of breaching the 1991 agreement on advance notice of military exercises, which requires warships to keep 3 nautical miles apart.

It was the first naval collision between the two since 2011 and the first direct military contact since May 2025. Retired Pakistani Vice Admiral Ahmad Saeed told Al Jazeera that there is "no bilateral Incidents at Sea agreement … and no navy-to-navy hotline", and warned of escalation from actions such as fire-control radar lock-ons.

ALLIANCES: PAKISTAN'S NEW PARTNERS

Pakistan has used its performance in the May 2025 conflict to strengthen ties with Gulf and regional powers. The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye on 7 August 2026, builds on the Saudi–Pakistani pact of September 2025. It commits each member to treat an armed attack on one as an attack on all; Türkiye's foreign minister described it as "technically the same" as NATO's Article 5. The pact does not name India, but it links a nuclear-armed Pakistan with Saudi finance and Turkish defence industry. India's foreign ministry said it would study the implications for its national security.

India rejects any third-party role in its disputes with Pakistan, including President Trump's repeated claims to have brokered the 2025 ceasefire.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that India has about 180 nuclear warheads and Pakistan about 170. Pakistan's doctrine includes short-range "tactical" nuclear weapons intended to deter an Indian conventional offensive. India has a declared policy of no first use. The May 2025 conflict took place below the nuclear threshold, but it involved strikes on air bases and missile exchanges that went further than any previous crisis between two nuclear-armed states. Munir's anniversary speech, with its warning of "far-reaching" consequences, was described in Indian media as a return to nuclear rhetoric.

PAKISTAN-ADMINISTERED KASHMIR

Pakistan faces its own unrest in the territory it administers. Protests led by the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee over twelve legislative seats reserved for Kashmiri refugees living elsewhere in Pakistan, upheld by the Supreme Court on 7 June 2026, turned deadly in July. The authorities designated the committee a terrorist organisation, imposed internet shutdowns and arrested activists. Dozens of people were reported killed. The unrest gives India a political argument and complicates Pakistan's claim to speak for Kashmiris on both sides of the LoC.

OUTLOOK: WHAT TO WATCH

• A mass-casualty attack. The chain of events of 2025, an attack on civilians followed within two weeks by Indian strikes, is now the expected pattern. The Jammu region is the most likely location.
• Incidents at sea. With no incidents-at-sea agreement or navy hotline, another close encounter could escalate. An agreement on either would be a useful confidence-building step.
• Water. Indian moves to speed up storage projects on the Chenab or Jhelum, or to alter flows during critical seasons, would test Pakistan's warnings.
• Diplomacy. There are no formal talks. The hotline between the two directors general of military operations is the main regular channel, and any backchannel would be the first sign of change.
• The new alliance. How Saudi Arabia and Türkiye would respond in an India–Pakistan crisis is untested. Their role in any future mediation could be significant.

The LoC is quieter than it has been for years, but the relationship as a whole is more dangerous. The 2025 war removed some of the restraint that kept earlier crises limited, and there is less in place to stop the next one.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

What is the situation on the Line of Control in September 2026?

The ceasefire agreed on 10 May 2025 still holds, and firing on the LoC has been rare, with brief incidents such as a small-arms exchange in Kupwara in February 2026. Militant attacks continue inside Jammu and Kashmir, mainly in the Jammu region.

What happened in the India–Pakistan conflict of May 2025?

After gunmen killed 26 people at Pahalgam on 22 April 2025, India launched Operation Sindoor on 7 May, striking nine sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Four days of air, missile, drone and artillery exchanges followed before a ceasefire on 10 May.

Is the Indus Waters Treaty still in force?

On 1 September 2026 the Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled unanimously that the treaty "remains fully in force" and that India must observe it. India, which placed the treaty in abeyance in April 2025, rejects the court's authority and says the suspension will continue until Pakistan ends support for terrorism.

What happened between the Indian and Pakistani navies in September 2026?

On 15 September 2026 the Indian destroyer INS Kolkata and the Pakistani vessel PNS Hunain collided in the Arabian Sea. Each side blamed the other and both summoned the other's diplomats. It was the first direct military contact since May 2025.

What is the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement?

It is a mutual defence pact signed by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye on 7 August 2026, under which an armed attack on one member is treated as an attack on all. It expands the Saudi–Pakistani defence agreement of September 2025.

Where is militant violence in Jammu and Kashmir concentrated?

ACLED data show that more than 60% of militant activity in 2025 took place in the Jammu division, especially the Pir Panjal districts of Poonch and Rajouri, the Chenab valley and Kathua, compared with 5% in 2018.

How many nuclear weapons do India and Pakistan have?

SIPRI estimates that India has about 180 nuclear warheads and Pakistan about 170. India has a no-first-use policy; Pakistan maintains short-range nuclear weapons intended to deter a conventional Indian attack.

Could there be another India–Pakistan war?

A full-scale war remains unlikely, but another limited conflict is possible. The most likely trigger is a mass-casualty attack in India attributed to Pakistan-based groups, which could again lead to Indian strikes and Pakistani retaliation.

AUTHOR

SOURCES AND REFERENCES

• Al Jazeera – India-Pakistan navy ship collision sparks alarm over unintended escalation
• The Diplomat – Indian, Pakistani naval vessels collide in Arabian Sea
• Al Jazeera – Pakistan wins Indus waters battle at The Hague, but India threat remains
• Council on Foreign Relations – Conflict Between India and Pakistan
• ACLED – In Jammu and Kashmir, new risks for security forces and civilians
• IISS – Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye: a new defence pact
• Business Today – Asim Munir's rhetoric on the Operation Sindoor anniversary
• Kashmir Reader – CM Omar reiterates demand to restore J&K's statehood
• The Week – Udhampur encounter: two suspected JeM militants killed
• SIPRI Yearbook – World nuclear forces
• International Crisis Group – India-Pakistan (Kashmir)