WHAT CHANGED SINCE APRIL

The April edition of this briefing described a "hybrid" contest in the South China Sea that was drifting towards permanent confrontation. That remains the best summary, but the details have moved. A provisional arrangement for resupplying the Philippine outpost at Second Thomas Shoal worked through the first months of 2026 and then came under strain. China has used an environmental designation at Scarborough Shoal to justify keeping Philippine boats out. The United States, Japan and the Philippines held their largest joint exercise yet, with missiles deployed on the Luzon Strait facing Taiwan. And the Philippines, as ASEAN chair for 2026, has put its credibility behind finishing a code of conduct with China.

The South China Sea carries more than $4.5 trillion of trade a year. With the Strait of Hormuz closed, East Asia's energy supply depends even more on the sea lanes that pass through it.

$4.5T
Annual trade through the sea
13
Safe resupply missions to 4 March
17,000
Troops in Balikatan 2026
534
Acres reclaimed by Vietnam in a year

TIMELINE: JUNE 2024 TO SEPTEMBER 2026

THE FLASHPOINTS

Second Thomas Shoal

Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin) lies inside the Philippine exclusive economic zone, about 1,000 km from mainland China. A small detachment of Filipino marines lives on the rusting Sierra Madre, deliberately grounded there in 1999. China has tried for years to block the food, water and materials the outpost needs. The provisional arrangement agreed after June 2024 has never been published in full, and the two sides describe it differently, but it allowed routine missions to proceed through early 2026. The baton incident of 21 July shows that the arrangement reduces the risk without removing it. Both sides blamed the other, and the US called China's actions "dangerous and aggressive".

Scarborough Shoal

Scarborough Shoal, about 220 km west of Luzon, has been under effective Chinese control since a 2012 standoff. Filipino fishermen have used it for generations. The nature reserve is a new legal instrument for the same aim: Chinese vessels now tell Philippine ships to leave an "environmental reserve" as well as Chinese waters. The Philippines, the US and others see it as a way to present exclusion as conservation. Water cannon and close manoeuvres near the shoal continued in July.

Sabina Shoal and the Spratlys

Sabina Shoal (Escoda) is closer to Palawan and to Second Thomas Shoal. It became a flashpoint in 2024, when a Philippine Coast Guard cutter stayed there for five months before withdrawing. The 18 September ramming happened on a civilian mission to supply fishermen; the Philippine Coast Guard stressed that the ship was on a "humanitarian and livelihood mission", not a military resupply. China says the Philippine vessel "suddenly accelerated to cut across the bow" of its ship. The flare incidents over the Spratlys in April and September extend the pressure into the air.

ANALYST NOTE

Manila's strategy since 2023 has been "assertive transparency": publishing video of every incident and taking journalists on patrols. Teodoro's rebuttal in Seoul went viral for the same reason. Analysts quoted by Radio Free Asia note that the approach has been more effective at gaining attention than at changing Chinese behaviour, and warn of "exposure fatigue" as incidents become routine. Behind the public campaign, Manila and Beijing keep private channels open to manage operational risk.

THE ALLIANCE: FROM THE SOUTH CHINA SEA TO TAIWAN

The US–Philippine alliance has shifted its focus north. Balikatan 2026, held from 20 April to 8 May, was described by US Indo-Pacific commander Admiral Samuel Paparo as a rehearsal for the defence of the Philippines. Its most notable elements were in the Luzon Strait. The US Marine Corps flew the NMESIS coastal anti-ship system, armed with Naval Strike Missiles with a range of about 185 km, into Batanes province, which lies about 100 miles south of Taiwan. The US Army fired a Tomahawk from the Typhon mid-range launcher, which has remained in northern Luzon since 2024. Japan sent combat units for the first time.

These deployments tie the Philippine archipelago to any future Taiwan contingency. They give Manila stronger deterrence, but they also make Philippine territory more likely to be involved in a wider war, and Beijing treats them as a threat. Washington has continued to issue statements backing Manila after each incident.

THE CODE OF CONDUCT

ASEAN and China committed to work towards a code of conduct in their 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, but negotiations have moved slowly. In July 2023 they adopted guidelines promising to finish it within three years, meaning by July 2026. That deadline has passed. At the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting in July, the two sides expressed the political will to finish within the year, and the Philippines proposed meeting as often as weekly. Manila now targets the end of 2026.

Four issues remain open: the geographical scope of the code, whether it will be legally binding, its relationship to the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, and its terms of reference. Even the meaning of "self-restraint" has not been agreed. A code that is not binding, or that leaves out the disputed features, would allow both sides to claim success while changing little at sea.

VIETNAM AND THE WIDER CONTEST

The Philippines is the most visible challenger to China, but not the only claimant expanding its position. Satellite imagery analysed by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) shows Vietnam building at 27 sites on at least 18 Spratly reefs. It reclaimed 534 acres in the past year and about 2,237 acres over five years, and a 13,000-foot runway is planned at Barque Canada Reef. AMTI's Harrison Prétat says Hanoi "is likely hoping that this development will deter Chinese action". China still holds about twice as much reclaimed land and four airstrips, with a fifth likely at Antelope Reef. AMTI reports that China's maritime militia deployed in record numbers across the sea in 2025.

Hanoi and Beijing have so far handled their dispute more quietly than Manila, through protests and diplomatic channels.

OUTLOOK: WHAT TO WATCH

The likely course remains persistent contest without war. The risk lies in accumulation: each year brings more vessels, more encounters and more capable weapons into a small area, and a single miscalculation could now draw in the United States directly.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

What is happening between China and the Philippines in September 2026?

On 18 September 2026 a China Coast Guard ship rammed a Philippine fisheries vessel near Sabina Shoal, off Palawan. Earlier in September Chinese forces fired flares at a Philippine Coast Guard aircraft over the Spratlys. In July a Filipino sailor was struck with a baton at Second Thomas Shoal and water cannon were used near Scarborough Shoal.

What is the Second Thomas Shoal resupply arrangement?

After a violent clash in June 2024, Manila and Beijing agreed a provisional arrangement for Philippine resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre, a grounded warship used as an outpost. Thirteen missions were completed without dangerous encounters through 4 March 2026, but a Filipino sailor was injured there in July.

What is the Scarborough Shoal nature reserve?

In September 2025 China approved a 3,523-hectare national nature reserve at Scarborough Shoal. Chinese ships now use it to order Philippine vessels to leave. The Philippines rejects it, and the US called it an attempt to use "dubious environmental and legal pretexts" to advance China's claims.

Is the 2016 arbitration ruling still valid?

Yes. The 2016 ruling found no legal basis for China's claims to historic rights within the nine-dash line. China rejects it. In July 2026, on its tenth anniversary, the Philippines, the US, Japan, Australia, the UK and 13 other countries reaffirmed that it is binding.

Will ASEAN agree a code of conduct with China in 2026?

The July 2026 deadline passed without agreement. ASEAN and China say they want to finish within the year, and the Philippines, which chairs ASEAN in 2026, targets the end of the year. The scope of the code and whether it will be legally binding remain unresolved.

What did the US deploy in the Philippines during Balikatan 2026?

The US deployed the NMESIS anti-ship missile system to Batanes on the Luzon Strait and fired a Tomahawk missile from its Typhon launcher in the Philippines for the first time. About 17,000 troops took part, including 1,400 from Japan.

Is Vietnam building islands in the South China Sea?

Yes. Satellite imagery shows Vietnam building at 27 sites on at least 18 Spratly reefs and reclaiming 534 acres in the past year. China still holds about twice as much reclaimed land and has resumed reclamation at Antelope Reef in the Paracels.

Would the US defend the Philippines in the South China Sea?

The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty commits the US to respond to an armed attack on Philippine forces, and Washington has said this covers the Philippine armed forces, coast guard and public vessels anywhere in the South China Sea. No incident has yet been treated as an armed attack.

AUTHOR

EDITOR · GEOPOLITICAL & MILITARY SYSTEMS

Kasim Kasimoglu is a geopolitical and military systems analyst focusing on conventional warfare, force posture, and nuclear deterrence. His analysis integrates open-source intelligence with structured military assessment frameworks, drawing on reporting from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and national defense ministries. His work centers on state-level conflicts across Europe and the Indo-Pacific, with an emphasis on operational dynamics and strategic balance.

Read more about the WarWatch editorial team on the About page.

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