WHAT CHANGED SINCE APRIL

The April edition of this briefing described North Korea's shift "from experimental deterrence to operational nuclear force". The months since have confirmed that shift and given it political form. The Ninth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, held from 19 to 25 February, set a five-year plan focused on "increasing the number of nuclear weapons and expanding the means and space for nuclear operation". It also formally removed South Korea from the category of compatriots. Kim Jong Un then pointed to the US and Israeli war on Iran as proof that his country was right to keep its weapons.

North Korea's diplomatic position has also improved. Its troops fought for Russia in Kursk, Xi Jinping made his first visit to Pyongyang since 2019, and neither Moscow nor Beijing now presses for denuclearisation. The United States and South Korea both say they want dialogue. North Korea says it will talk only on its own terms.

19–25 FEB
Ninth Party Congress
2
Choe Hyon-class destroyers commissioned
20K+
Troops sent to Russia since 2024
12 SEP
Joint firepower strike drill

TIMELINE: JANUARY TO SEPTEMBER 2026

THE PARTY CONGRESS: NUCLEAR STATUS AS DOCTRINE

North Korea wrote its nuclear status into the constitution in 2023. The Ninth Congress made it the organising principle of the next five years. According to reporting by the Arms Control Association and others, the plan calls for more advanced ICBMs, more capable satellites, more warheads, the "nuclear weaponisation of naval surface and underwater forces" and an integrated nuclear crisis response system. Kim called for ICBMs that can be launched from underwater and for a larger arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, including artillery and short-range missiles aimed at South Korea. He described nuclear weapons as the "backbone" of the country's deterrence and war strategy and said that dismantling them "can never happen unless the whole world changes".

The congress also formalised the break with Seoul announced in 2023. The party charter now describes South Korea as a separate and hostile state. Kim said North Korea "has absolutely nothing to discuss with South Korea, the most hostile entity" and would "permanently exclude South Korea from the category of compatriots". Towards Washington the tone was more open. Kim said that if the US "respects our country's current status as stipulated in the Constitution … and withdraws its hostile policy … there is no reason why we cannot get along well with the United States".

ANALYST NOTE

The congress set a clear sequence. North Korea will not negotiate about its weapons; it will negotiate only about their consequences, such as sanctions, exercises and recognition. Any US–North Korea meeting would now start from arms control between nuclear states, not denuclearisation. That is the reason Pyongyang ignores Seoul while signalling openness to Washington.

WEAPONS: WHAT IS NEW IN 2026

Tactical and short-range systems

Most of the 2026 launches have involved short-range and tactical systems intended for use against South Korea and US bases there: variants of the Hwasong-11 family, the new Hwasongpho-11 Ka, cluster-munition warheads and 600mm multiple rocket launchers that North Korea describes as nuclear-capable. The 12 September drill showed the doctrine behind them. It combined ballistic missiles, rockets, cruise missiles and drones from five units to overwhelm targets from several directions, which state media said was meant to "bring down the enemy's armed forces organisationally and structurally once an order is issued".

The navy

The largest visible change is at sea. North Korea has commissioned two 5,000-tonne Choe Hyon-class destroyers in less than three months. Both are armed with vertical launch cells for cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles that Pyongyang says can carry nuclear warheads. Kang Kon, the second ship, capsized during a failed launch in 2025 and was repaired. Together with the congress goal of arming "underwater forces", this points to a sea-based nuclear capability that would be harder to target than land launchers.

Strategic missiles

North Korea has not flight-tested an ICBM in 2026. Its newest design, the solid-fuel Hwasong-20 shown at a parade in October 2025, has not yet flown. Ground tests of an upgraded solid rocket motor in 2025 and 2026 suggest it is working on larger payloads, possibly including multiple warheads. The International Atomic Energy Agency reports continued plutonium production at the Yongbyon reactor and a new building there similar in size to the known enrichment halls.

RUSSIA AND CHINA

The partnership with Russia has been the most important change in North Korea's position since 2024. Under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, which includes a mutual defence clause, North Korea has sent more than 20,000 troops to Russia, mainly to Kursk, along with large quantities of munitions. Ukrainian military intelligence estimates North Korean casualties at more than 7,000. About 11,000 troops were reported to be in Kursk at the start of 2026, including 1,000 engineers. In return, North Korea has reportedly received Russian help with satellites, drones and air defence, and the units sent to Kursk have gained modern combat experience. The Tumen River road bridge, opened on 8 September, gives the relationship a permanent land link.

China had kept its distance while Pyongyang moved closer to Moscow. Xi's state visit on 8–9 June, his first since 2019, restored high-level ties. The official readouts made no reference to denuclearisation. Rail links reopened in March. China remains North Korea's largest trading partner by far.

THE IRAN WAR AS A LESSON

For Pyongyang, the war against Iran that began on 28 February has confirmed its central argument. Iran, which never built a bomb, was attacked by Israel and the United States in June 2025 and again in 2026; North Korea, which did build one, has not been attacked. Kim said as much in March. Analysts at 38 North and the Korea Economic Institute of America expect North Korea to draw operational lessons as well: more mobile and dispersed launchers, hardened command and control, and a greater emphasis on solid-fuel systems that can be fired quickly.

The same war shows the limits of that argument. Nuclear weapons have not ended sanctions, diplomatic isolation or the risk of pressure short of invasion. They do, however, make an attack on North Korea itself far more costly than the strikes on Iran.

SOUTH KOREA, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, in office since June 2025, has sought to reopen contact with the North and has urged President Trump to talk to Kim. On 18 September he said that "President Trump wants dialogue, and I am also urging President Trump to engage in dialogue". North Korea has rejected his overtures. Trump has repeatedly said he would like to meet Kim, but no meeting has been arranged, and the US has not indicated that it would accept North Korea as a nuclear state.

The allies have continued to exercise together. South Korea held joint air and missile defence drills in March, and the trilateral Freedom Edge exercise with the US and Japan ended on 11 September, prompting the next day's launches. US Indo-Pacific Command said those launches posed no immediate threat to US territory or allies.

OUTLOOK: WHAT TO WATCH

North Korea is not preparing for war. It is preparing to be accepted as a permanent nuclear power, and 2026 has moved it closer to that goal than at any point since the 2018–2019 summits.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

What missiles has North Korea launched in 2026?

North Korea has launched short-range and close-range ballistic missiles several times in 2026, including about ten from Sunan on 14 March and a combined drill on 12 September involving ballistic missiles, 600mm rockets, cruise missiles and drones. It has not flight-tested an ICBM this year.

What was decided at North Korea's Ninth Party Congress?

The congress, held from 19 to 25 February 2026, adopted a five-year plan to increase the number of nuclear weapons and expand ways of delivering them, including from ships and submarines. It also wrote the "two hostile states" policy into the party charter, treating South Korea as a separate hostile state.

Will North Korea give up its nuclear weapons?

No. Kim Jong Un has said denuclearisation "can never happen unless the whole world changes". North Korea says it could get along with the US only if Washington respects its nuclear status and ends its "hostile policy".

What is the Choe Hyon-class destroyer?

It is North Korea's largest warship, a 5,000-tonne destroyer armed with cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles that Pyongyang says can carry nuclear warheads. The first ship was commissioned on 23 June 2026 and the second, Kang Kon, on 6 September 2026.

Are North Korean troops still fighting for Russia?

North Korea has sent more than 20,000 troops to Russia since late 2024, mainly to Kursk, and about 11,000 were reported there at the start of 2026. Ukraine estimates more than 7,000 North Korean casualties. In return North Korea is reported to receive Russian help with satellites, drones and air defence.

How has the Iran war affected North Korea?

Kim Jong Un has said the US war on Iran proves North Korea was right to keep its nuclear weapons. Analysts expect Pyongyang to make its arsenal more mobile and harder to target in response.

Will Trump meet Kim Jong Un?

Trump has said he wants to meet Kim, and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung is urging dialogue, but no meeting has been arranged. North Korea's condition is that the US accept its status as a nuclear state.

Can North Korea strike the US mainland?

North Korea has tested ICBMs with the range to reach the continental United States, most recently before 2026. Questions remain about the reliability of its re-entry vehicles and guidance under combat conditions, and the newest solid-fuel ICBM, the Hwasong-20, has not yet been flight-tested.

AUTHOR

EDITOR · GEOPOLITICAL & MILITARY SYSTEMS

Kasim Kasimoglu is a geopolitical and military systems analyst focusing on conventional warfare, force posture, and nuclear deterrence. His analysis integrates open-source intelligence with structured military assessment frameworks, drawing on reporting from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and national defense ministries. His work centers on state-level conflicts across Europe and the Indo-Pacific, with an emphasis on operational dynamics and strategic balance.

Read more about the WarWatch editorial team on the About page.

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