WHAT CHANGED SINCE APRIL
The April edition of this briefing described post-Assad Syria as a patchwork of rival authorities with no unified political order. That description no longer fits. Since January 2026 the transitional government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa has brought the north-east under its control, integrated the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), renegotiated Russia's military presence and secured the removal of almost all Western sanctions. It has also kept Syria out of the Iran war, despite missile debris, Hezbollah shelling and refugee flows from Lebanon.
The state that has emerged is centralised and dominated by the president. Its critics point to an appointed-heavy parliament, sectarian killings on the coast in 2025 and in Suwayda that have not been fully accounted for, and a security apparatus built largely from former rebel factions. The question for Syria is no longer whether it will fragment, but what kind of state is being consolidated.
TIMELINE: MARCH 2025 TO SEPTEMBER 2026
- March 2025: Al-Sharaa signs a Constitutional Declaration that sets a five-year transitional period. Attacks by Assad loyalists on the coast are followed by mass killings of Alawite civilians by government-aligned forces.
- July 2025: Fighting between Bedouin tribes, government forces and Druze militias in Suwayda kills about 1,700 people, mostly Druze civilians, according to the UN Commission of Inquiry. Israel strikes government forces and the defence ministry in Damascus.
- 5 October 2025: Indirect elections fill 119 seats in a new 210-member People's Assembly. No vote is held in Suwayda or in SDF-held Raqqa and Hasakah.
- December 2025: The US Congress repeals the Caesar Act sanctions through the annual defence authorisation bill.
- January 2026: A new Syrian pound, with two zeros removed, replaces the Assad-era currency.
- 6–18 January: Government forces take the Kurdish district of Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo, then advance east. Within days they and allied Arab tribes capture Tabqa, the Euphrates Dam, Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor's oil and gas fields and al-Shaddadah, where Islamic State prisoners escape during the fighting.
- 19–30 January: President Trump calls al-Sharaa and secures a commitment not to enter Hasakah city. After several ceasefires, the two sides sign a comprehensive integration agreement on 29–30 January, mediated by US envoy Tom Barrack.
- 22 February: Al-Hol camp, which held families of Islamic State fighters, is closed. The UN says 15,000–20,000 former residents are unaccounted for.
- 28 February – April: The Iran war begins. Syria declares neutrality and deploys troops to its borders. Missile debris kills civilians in Suwayda, shells from Lebanon land near Serghaya, and about 125,000 people cross from Lebanon in three weeks. US forces hand over the Qasrak base on 16 April.
- 1 July: Al-Sharaa appoints the final 70 members of the People's Assembly.
- 9 July: The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons restores Syria's rights, suspended since 2021.
- 9–11 August: Syria and Russia sign a memorandum converting the Hmeimim and Tartus bases into "joint training centres". A Damascus court sentences Bashar and Maher al-Assad to death in absentia.
- 18–25 August: Israel strikes Abu al-Duhur air base in Idlib. The IAEA confirms that "a few tons of nuclear material" have been found at a former government site. The US removes Syria from its list of state sponsors of terrorism on 24 August, and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi announces the dissolution of the SDF in Damascus on 25 August.
THE NORTH-EAST: FROM OFFENSIVE TO INTEGRATION
The March 2025 agreement between al-Sharaa and the SDF had promised integration but produced little. In January 2026 Damascus used force instead. The offensive began in Aleppo on 6 January and turned east on 13 January. Its speed came from the defection of Arab tribes that had served under the SDF: tribal fighters took Raqqa and al-Shaddadah before government troops arrived, and the Shammar tribe later seized the Yaarubiyah crossing to Iraq. In less than a week the SDF lost Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, the al-Omar oil field and much of Hasakah province. The US military publicly asked government forces to stop and later carried out air strikes on tribal fighters near al-Hol.
The final agreement gave Damascus control of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, all oil and gas fields, all border crossings and the Islamic State detention sites. SDF fighters were to join the army, non-Syrian PKK cadres were to leave, and Interior Ministry forces deployed to Hasakah and Qamishli while the army stayed outside those cities. In exchange Kurdish civil and educational rights were guaranteed, an SDF official was appointed governor of Hasakah, and the former YPG commander Sipan Hamo became deputy defence minister for the eastern region.
Implementation was slow at first. SDF officials warned in February of "renewed war". By August the governor reported administrative integration 70% complete and four SDF brigades absorbed into the army. On 20 August Abdi said military integration was finished and non-Syrian fighters had left, and on 25 August he announced the dissolution of the SDF at a press conference in Damascus. Unresolved issues include the Women's Protection Units and the status of Kobani.
The north-east settlement was decided less by negotiation than by the collapse of the SDF's Arab base and by Washington's choice to back Damascus. The US protected Hasakah and Qamishli from a full assault, but it did not reverse the government's gains. For Kurdish communities, the guarantees now depend on the goodwill of a government that has not yet shown it can prevent sectarian violence by its own forces.
SUWAYDA AND THE DRUZE
Suwayda is the main part of Syria where Damascus still does not hold military authority. After the July 2025 violence, the Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri formed a "National Guard" and demanded autonomy. A Syrian–Jordanian–US roadmap agreed in September 2025 set out steps on security, accountability and the return of displaced people, but it has not been implemented in full. Fighting continues at a low level. In late August a National Guard member was killed and around ten security personnel were injured in clashes near Mazraa, north-west of Suwayda city.
Israel says it is protecting the Druze and operates in Quneitra and Daraa, to the west. Al-Monitor reports that al-Hijri supports that presence and recently described Syria's Druze as "an integral part of the state of Israel". Damascus says national unity is a red line and that all armed groups must come under state control.
ISRAEL AND THE SOUTH
Since December 2024 Israel has occupied the UN buffer zone on the Golan, positions on Mount Hermon and further ground in southern Syria, and has carried out hundreds of strikes and incursions. In 2026 its strikes have hit government positions at Izraa in Daraa in March and Abu al-Duhur air base in Idlib on 18 August. Israel said the latter was a response to plans for a Turkish deployment; Damascus denied that such plans existed.
Al-Sharaa has chosen not to respond militarily. In July he told Al Jazeera that Syria was "actively working to reach a security agreement with Israel with the participation of several countries" and that such a deal could be a "gateway to a comprehensive peace", without giving up Syria's claim to the Golan. US-mediated de-escalation talks were held in Jordan on 24 August. No agreement has been announced.
THE IRAN WAR AND LEBANON
The Iran war tested Syria's new alignment. Under Assad, Syria was Iran's main land bridge to Hezbollah. Under al-Sharaa it declared neutrality on the first day of the war, reinforced its borders with Lebanon, Iraq and the Golan, and began arresting Hezbollah-linked cells, including one accused of planning a bombing near a Damascus church in April and another accused of sabotage in five provinces in May. Syria closed the Jdeidat Yabous crossing with Lebanon in April after Israeli threats.
The costs were real. Iranian missile debris killed at least four civilians in Suwayda on 28 February. Israel's suspension of gas exports to Egypt cut the supply Egypt passes on to Syria through Jordan, and electricity rationing increased. The war in Lebanon sent about 125,000 people across the border by 18 March, most of them Syrians returning home.
RUSSIA, TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES
Russia has kept its two bases, but on new terms. Under the 9 August memorandum, reached after 18 months of talks, Hmeimim airport and a commercial berth at Tartus will pass to Syrian civilian control, while the military facilities become "joint training and rehabilitation centres". The change takes effect within three months. Bashar al-Assad and his brother remain in Russia.
Turkey is one of the government's closest partners and a leading investor, alongside Qatar. A $7 billion power agreement signed in May 2025 with Qatari, Turkish and US firms aims to meet more than half of Syria's electricity needs, and Turkish and Qatari floating power ships have added about 800 MW.
The United States has moved from isolation to partnership in 18 months. The Caesar Act was repealed in December 2025, and the removal of Syria from the state sponsors of terrorism list on 24 August lifted the remaining US sanctions. US forces handed over the Qasrak base in the north-east in April as the SDF was absorbed.
ISLAMIC STATE
The UN estimates that the Islamic State has up to 3,000 fighters in Syria and has shifted to hit-and-run attacks in towns. The January fighting at al-Shaddadah prison let an unknown number of detainees escape: the SDF claimed 1,500, a US official said about 200 low-level fighters, many of them later recaptured. The closure of al-Hol has left thousands of former residents untraced. Government forces arrested a senior Islamic State military commander near Manbij on 18 August.
ECONOMY, RETURNS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The World Bank estimated in October 2025 that reconstruction would cost about $216 billion, including $108 billion in direct damage to physical assets. Sanctions relief has opened the door to investment, and the new currency, introduced in January, dropped two zeros from the old pound. Electricity supply remains limited and dependent on imported gas.
UNHCR reports that more than 3 million Syrians have returned since December 2024, while about 4 million remain in neighbouring countries and 5.5 million are still displaced inside Syria. Many returnees find destroyed homes, property disputes and few jobs.
On accountability, the government has prosecuted Assad-era figures, with death sentences in absentia for Bashar and Maher al-Assad on 11 August and their cousin Wassim on 18 August. It has done much less about the coastal killings of March 2025 and the Suwayda violence of July 2025, in which government-aligned forces were implicated.
OUTLOOK: WHAT TO WATCH
- Suwayda. Either a negotiated arrangement for Druze self-government within the state, or a military attempt to impose central control. The second would risk direct Israeli intervention.
- An Israel–Syria security agreement. A deal on the south would be the most important foreign policy step of the transition. Its absence leaves Israeli strikes as a constant risk.
- Kurdish integration in practice. Kobani, the women's units and the conduct of government forces in Hasakah will show whether the August settlement holds.
- Islamic State. The escaped detainees and the untraced al-Hol population are the main sources of risk for a revival.
- Political opening. The five-year transition ends in 2030. Whether the government moves towards competitive elections, or consolidates around the presidency, will decide how durable the new order is.
For the first time since 2011, the most likely course for Syria is continued consolidation under a single government. The risks have shifted from state collapse to the terms of that consolidation: who is included, who is protected, and how much of the south remains beyond Damascus's reach.
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
What is the situation in Syria in September 2026?
President Ahmed al-Sharaa's transitional government controls most of the country. The Kurdish-led SDF announced its dissolution into the state on 25 August 2026, and the US lifted its remaining sanctions on 24 August. Druze-held Suwayda remains outside full government control, and Israel continues to occupy parts of the south.
What happened to the SDF?
A government offensive in January 2026 took Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor and the oil fields from the SDF after Arab tribes changed sides. A US-mediated agreement on 29–30 January set terms for integration, and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi announced the dissolution of the force in Damascus on 25 August 2026.
Who controls Suwayda?
Suwayda is largely held by the Druze "National Guard" loyal to Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, who demands autonomy. It is the main area where the government does not hold military authority. About 1,700 people were killed in fighting there in July 2025.
Is Israel still attacking Syria?
Yes. Israel occupies the Golan buffer zone and parts of southern Syria and has struck Syrian targets in 2026, including Abu al-Duhur air base on 18 August. Syria is seeking a security agreement, and US-mediated talks were held in Jordan in August.
Are sanctions on Syria lifted?
Most are. The US repealed the Caesar Act in December 2025 and removed Syria from its list of state sponsors of terrorism on 24 August 2026, which lifted the remaining US sanctions. The EU and UK had eased sanctions earlier.
How did the Iran war affect Syria?
Syria declared neutrality. It deployed troops to its borders, arrested Hezbollah-linked cells and received about 125,000 people fleeing Lebanon in March 2026. Missile debris killed civilians in Suwayda, and cuts to gas supplies increased power rationing.
What happened to Russia's bases in Syria?
Under a memorandum signed on 9 August 2026, Russia's Hmeimim air base and Tartus naval facility will become "joint training centres", while civilian parts of both sites pass to Syrian control within three months.
How many Syrian refugees have returned?
UNHCR reports that more than 3 million Syrians have returned since December 2024. About 4 million remain in neighbouring countries and 5.5 million are internally displaced. The World Bank estimates reconstruction will cost about $216 billion.
AUTHOR
Arda Alkis is an energy and hybrid conflict analyst specializing in maritime security, strategic chokepoints, and irregular warfare. His work is based on open-source intelligence and data from ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data), the International Crisis Group (ICG), and international reporting networks. He focuses on energy-driven conflicts, proxy warfare, and instability across the Middle East, Africa, and global trade corridors.
Read more about the WarWatch editorial team on the About page.
SOURCES AND REFERENCES
- Security Council Report – Syria, September 2026 Monthly Forecast
- Security Council Report – Syria, April 2026 Monthly Forecast
- 2026 north-eastern Syria offensive – timeline and agreement terms
- International Crisis Group – An Opportunity for Calm in North-eastern Syria
- Al-Monitor – Fresh fighting in Syria's Suwayda leaves one dead
- Al Jazeera – President Ahmed al-Sharaa: Syria seeking security deal with Israel
- Al Jazeera – Syria says it reached deal with Moscow on future of Russian bases
- The National – Syria and Russia agree to transform military bases into joint training centres
- World Bank – Syria's post-conflict reconstruction costs estimated at $216 billion
- Curtis – US repeals the Caesar Act in latest move to ease Syria sanctions
- Syria in the 2026 Iran war – timeline
TRACK SYRIA AND LEVANT DEVELOPMENTS IN REAL TIME
⊙ OPEN LIVE MAP