Red Sea Crisis 2026: Houthi Blockade, Bab el-Mandeb Takeover and Global Shipping

WHAT CHANGED SINCE MARCH

When this briefing was first published in March 2026, the Red Sea was quieter than it had been at any point since 2023. The Houthis had stopped attacking merchant ships after the Gaza ceasefire of 10 October 2025, and the shipping industry was debating when to return to the Suez Canal. That picture no longer holds. The war between Iran, Israel and the United States that began on 28 February pulled the Houthis back in, first against Israel, then against Saudi Arabia, and in September on the ground along Yemen's own coast.

The result is a crisis that differs from the one of 2023–2025. The earlier campaign was a broad threat to any vessel the Houthis could link to Israel, the US or the UK. The present one is narrower at sea, because it is aimed at Saudi-linked tonnage, but it is more serious on land, because the group now holds the ground on the Yemeni side of the strait. The Bab el-Mandeb carries about 12% of global trade, including roughly 11% of seaborne oil and 8% of LNG, according to figures cited by Al Jazeera.

TIMELINE: FROM PAUSE TO BLOCKADE

• November 2023 – September 2025: The Houthis attack more than 100 commercial vessels. Four ships are sunk (Rubymar, Tutor, Magic Seas and Eternity C), two are hijacked and at least eight seafarers are killed. A US air campaign from March to May 2025 ends with an Oman-brokered truce on 6 May 2025 that covers US warships but not merchant shipping.
• 29 September 2025: The Dutch-flagged Minervagracht is hit in the Gulf of Aden. It is the last attack of the Gaza-linked campaign.
• 10 October 2025: The Gaza ceasefire begins and the attacks stop. BIMCO records that Suez Canal transits are still 60% below 2023 levels in the first week of 2026, 100 days after the last attack.
• 28 March 2026: One month into the Iran war, the Houthis fire a ballistic missile at Beersheba and resume missile and drone attacks on Israel. They do not attack merchant ships.
• 8 June: The group declares a "complete and total ban" on Israeli navigation in the Red Sea. The UN Secretary-General's monthly report still records no new incidents against shipping between 9 May and 9 June.
• 13 July: Saudi Arabia reportedly strikes the runway at Sanaa airport to stop an Iranian aircraft from landing with a Houthi delegation on board. The Houthis answer with missiles and drones against Abha airport in southern Saudi Arabia.
• 20 July: Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree announces a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia, which he describes as "an eye for an eye". Two Saudi oil tankers are attacked with missiles and drones on 22 July, and Saudi aircraft bomb Hodeidah and Kamaran island on 24 July.
• 4 August: The Indian-flagged cargo vessel MSV Faize Noore Oliya sinks after a projectile strike near Yemeni waters. All 14 crew are rescued by the Yemeni Coast Guard and taken to Mokha. Houthi responsibility has not been independently confirmed.
• 17 and 24 August: The Houthis claim a missile attack on another Saudi ship. A week later a VLCC owned by the Saudi carrier Bahri is hit by a projectile off Yanbu, according to Lloyd's List Intelligence.
• 3–11 September: A Houthi ground offensive in Taiz governorate reaches the coast. Mokha, Dhubab, Hays, Al Khawkhah and the Hanish islands fall on 10 September, and the Yemeni government confirms its withdrawal from Perim island on 11 September.

THE BLOCKADE OF SAUDI SHIPPING

The blockade matters because of where Saudi oil now goes. With the Strait of Hormuz largely closed since February, Riyadh has pushed crude across the country through the East–West pipeline and loaded it at Yanbu on the Red Sea. Around 70% of Saudi oil exports were leaving through Red Sea ports by the summer. That shift turned the Red Sea from a transit corridor into Saudi Arabia's main export outlet, and it gave the Houthis a target with direct effect on the oil price.

The effect on traffic has so far been limited. Lloyd's List Intelligence counted an average of 319 ships a week through the Bab el-Mandeb before the blockade took effect and 273 a week between 27 July and 23 August, which is a fall of about 15%. Its analysts report that operators see the threat as confined to "a specific subset of Saudi-linked tonnage" and not to the wider industry. Saudi crude has been rerouted northbound through the Suez Canal, with tankers loading part-cargoes at Yanbu and topping up at Egypt's Sidi Kerir terminal. This has lengthened voyages and produced the third spike in VLCC spot rates since the crisis began.

Two points of caution apply to the attack record. First, several incidents are known only from Houthi claims or from single maritime-security reports, and ship names have not always been published. Second, the one vessel lost, the Faize Noore Oliya, was a small Indian-flagged cargo ship with no evident Saudi connection, which suggests that targeting in practice is less precise than the Houthi statements imply.

THE SEPTEMBER OFFENSIVE AND THE STRAIT

The ground offensive is the larger change. From 6 August the Houthis struck Yemeni government positions across the country with missiles and drones. On 3 September they launched what was described as a massive offensive in Taiz governorate to cut the road between Taiz city and Mokha; at least 129 people were reported killed in the first clashes. Government forces of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) retook several hills on 4 and 8–9 September, but the coastal front collapsed on 10 September. Mokha fell, PLC units retreated towards Dhubab, and Dhubab was captured the same day, together with the districts of Hays and Al Khawkhah further north.

Perim island, also called Mayun, sits in the narrowest part of the strait, about 20 km from the African coast. Reports of its capture on 10 September were confirmed the following day, when the Yemeni government said its forces had withdrawn. The Hanish islands, which lie beside the main shipping lanes further north, were reported captured at the same time. Al Jazeera's assessment on 13 September was that the Houthis now control Yemen's entire Red Sea coastline. More than 2,000 Yemenis crossed to Obock in Djibouti within 24 hours of the advance.

The Houthis have also widened their attacks on Saudi territory. A spokesman claimed that dozens of missiles and drones were fired at King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait. That claim has not been verified from independent sources.

OIL, YANBU AND THE EAST–WEST PIPELINE

On 11 September, the day Perim was confirmed lost, drones damaged the 745-mile East–West pipeline and Saudi Arabia shut it down. The Iraqi government said the drones were launched from Iraqi territory, and Tehran denied involvement, so this attack should not be attributed to the Houthis, although several early reports did so. Saudi officials told the Associated Press that repairs could take three to five weeks, with partial operation possible in the meantime.

Taken together, the pipeline outage and the Houthi advance put both ends of the Saudi bypass route under pressure in the same week. Brent crude came close to $110 a barrel and settled at $108.75 on 15 September, against a pre-war average of about $67. It eased to $104.82 on 17 September after reports that Saudi Arabia was offering more crude through Hormuz. Rapidan Energy expects Saudi exports to fall by about 400,000 barrels a day in September because of the outage. CBS News reports that Saudi output was already below 6 million barrels a day in August, far under its 10.42 million target.

Analysts cited before the offensive estimated that a full closure of the Bab el-Mandeb could remove as much as 7% of global oil supply. Writing in Foreign Affairs, April Longley Alley and Allison Minor argue that "Tehran's longer-term aim is to establish a daunting status quo" in which both chokepoints can be tightened at will.

CONTAINER SHIPPING: THE SUEZ RETURN CONTINUES

The container sector has not yet reacted in the way the headlines might suggest. The return to the Suez Canal that began after the October 2025 pause is still under way:

• Capacity: Sea-Intelligence estimates that more than a quarter of Asia–Europe capacity is sailing via the Red Sea in September. The share is 35% on the Asia–Mediterranean headhaul and 50–60% on the backhaul, but only 6% on the Asia–North Europe headhaul.
• Carriers: Cosco and OOCL resumed Suez transits on five services in mid-September, joining their Ocean Alliance partner CMA CGM. Maersk and CMA CGM were scheduled for 10 and 8 transits respectively in the week of 13–20 September.
• Canal traffic: The Suez Canal recorded 256 crossings in the week of 7–13 September, up 3.2% from 248 the week before.
• Freight rates: Freightos puts Asia–North Europe at about $4,300 per FEU and Asia–Mediterranean at about $4,200, down by roughly $2,000 and $3,000 from their July peaks.

The reason is the perception described above: carriers without Saudi links judge that they are not on the target list. That judgement rests on Houthi restraint and not on any protection. Insurers still classify the area as high-risk. A single hit on a returning container ship would probably reverse the trend within days, as it did in December 2023. Egypt has the most at stake after Saudi Arabia: it lost about $7 billion, around 60% of canal revenue, across 2023 and 2024.

WHY NAVAL POWER HAS NOT SETTLED IT

Operation Prosperity Guardian, set up by the US in December 2023, and the EU's Operation Aspides were designed to intercept missiles and drones aimed at ships and to escort vessels on request. They reduced losses but did not stop the attacks. The 2025 US air campaign ended in a truce that protected warships only. Israeli and Saudi air strikes on Hodeidah have not changed Houthi behaviour either.

In 2026 the available naval forces are stretched further. US and allied warships are committed to the Gulf of Oman and the Hormuz crisis. The maritime security expert Alexandru Cristian Hudisteanu told Al Jazeera that many navies use Djibouti for fleet logistics but operate under "specific mandates" that limit what they can do. At the UN Security Council, France, the UK and the US favour tougher sanctions on the Houthis, while China and Russia argue that this would undermine a negotiated settlement in Yemen. Resolution 2812 of January 2026 extended monthly reporting on Red Sea attacks but added no enforcement measures.

YEMEN AND THE HORN OF AFRICA

The fighting has reopened a war that had been largely frozen since the 2022 truce. The September battles in Taiz killed well over a hundred people in days, and the loss of Mokha cuts government-held Taiz city off from its nearest port. Yemen remains one of the largest humanitarian emergencies in the world, and Hodeidah, the main entry point for food imports to the north, has been bombed repeatedly since 2024, most recently by Saudi Arabia in July.

Across the water, Djibouti is receiving refugees at Obock and hosts American, French, Chinese and Japanese bases within sight of Houthi-held territory. Eritrea, which fought Yemen over the Hanish islands in 1995, gains leverage as states look for partners on the African shore. For the wider war, see our briefing on Iran.

OUTLOOK: THREE INDICATORS

The direction of the crisis over the next weeks will show in three places:

• The target list. If the Houthis extend the blockade from Saudi-linked ships to vessels calling at Saudi ports, or to all traffic serving states they regard as hostile, the 2024 pattern of mass diversion around the Cape of Good Hope will return quickly.
• Activity on the islands. Radar, missile or boat deployments on Perim and the Hanish group, or any report of mines, would change the risk for every ship in the strait and not only for Saudi tonnage.
• The Saudi and US response. Riyadh has so far answered with limited air strikes. A campaign to retake the coast would need ground forces that the PLC has just shown it lacks. The alternative is a deal, and Oman has mediated each previous one.

The Red Sea is now tied to the outcome of the Iran war. While Hormuz stays restricted, Yanbu is the outlet that keeps Saudi oil on the market, and the Houthis hold the southern gate to it.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

Are the Houthis attacking ships in the Red Sea in September 2026?

Yes, but selectively. After a pause that began in October 2025, the Houthis declared a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia on 20 July 2026 and have since attacked Saudi-linked tankers. The last reported strike before this update was on a Bahri-owned VLCC off Yanbu on 24 August.

Is the Bab el-Mandeb strait closed?

No. Ships are still transiting, and weekly traffic fell by only about 15% after the Saudi blockade began. The Houthis now hold Perim island and the Yemeni shore of the strait, which gives them the means to restrict it further if they choose.

What did the Houthis capture in September 2026?

On 10–11 September they took the port of Mokha, the coastal district of Dhubab, the districts of Hays and Al Khawkhah, the Hanish islands and Perim (Mayun) island. They now control Yemen's entire Red Sea coast.

Why are the Houthis blockading Saudi Arabia?

The blockade followed a reported Saudi strike on Sanaa airport on 13 July and Houthi attacks on Abha airport. It also serves Iran's strategy in the wider war, because Saudi Arabia has been exporting most of its oil through Red Sea ports since the Strait of Hormuz was restricted.

Did the Houthis attack the Saudi East–West pipeline?

The pipeline was damaged by drones on 11 September 2026 and shut down. Iraq's government said the drones were launched from Iraqi territory, so the attack is attributed to Iran-aligned groups in Iraq and not to the Houthis.

Are container ships returning to the Suez Canal?

Yes. Sea-Intelligence estimates that more than a quarter of Asia–Europe capacity is using the Red Sea in September 2026, and Cosco and OOCL resumed transits in mid-September. The trend depends on the Houthis continuing to spare ships without Saudi links.

How has the Red Sea crisis affected oil prices?

Brent crude approached $110 a barrel in mid-September 2026 after the Houthi advance and the East–West pipeline shutdown, compared with a pre-war average of about $67. It closed at $104.82 on 17 September.

What is Operation Prosperity Guardian?

It is a US-led multinational naval mission created in December 2023 to defend merchant shipping in the Red Sea. It works alongside the EU's Operation Aspides. Both intercept missiles and drones and escort ships, but neither has a mandate to remove the Houthis from the coast.

AUTHOR

SOURCES AND REFERENCES

• Al Jazeera – Red Sea nations watch as Houthis seize Bab al-Mandeb strait (13 Sept 2026)
• NPR / AP – Yemen's Houthis capture a Red Sea island in threat to shipping (12 Sept 2026)
• Lloyd's List Intelligence – Red Sea Brief, 3 September 2026
• Freightos – Red Sea transits accelerate, even as Houthis advance (15 Sept 2026)
• CBS News – Houthi advances, the East–West pipeline and oil prices
• CNBC – Oil prices after the Saudi pipeline attack (17 Sept 2026)
• Security Council Report – The Red Sea, July 2026 Monthly Forecast
• BIMCO – Suez Canal transits still 60% down 100 days after the last Houthi attack
• SAFETY4SEA – Indian cargo ship sinks off Yemen after projectile attack
• United Nations OCHA – Yemen