Strait of Hormuz Crisis 2026: 200 Days of Closure, Ship Attacks and $100 Oil

STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

For decades the closure of the Strait of Hormuz was the scenario every energy-security study modelled and almost none expected. The standard argument — that Iran would never close a waterway its own exports depend on, and that the US Navy could reopen it within days if it tried — was repeated in this briefing's first edition. Both halves of that argument have now been tested, and both failed.

Before the war, roughly 20 million barrels of oil a day — about a quarter of seaborne oil trade — and a fifth of the world's LNG passed through a channel 33 km wide at its narrowest. Since 28 February that flow has been cut to a trickle, producing what the International Energy Agency has called the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. This update reviews how the closure has been enforced, what it has cost, why neither military escorts nor diplomacy have ended it, and what would have to change for traffic to return.

TIMELINE OF THE CLOSURE

• 28 February: Hours after the first US–Israeli strikes on Iran, the IRGC Navy broadcasts VHF warnings forbidding passage. By 2 March tanker traffic has fallen about 70% and AIS signals in the strait drop to near zero; the IRGC formally confirms the closure.
• 1–11 March: The first wave of ship attacks. Crew are killed aboard the Skylight and MKD Vyom on 1 March; the UAE tug Mussafah 2 sinks on 6 March with four dead; the Thai bulk carrier Mayuree Naree is lost on 11 March with three dead. Protection-and-indemnity cover is withdrawn on 5 March.
• 8 March: Brent passes $100 for the first time in four years, on its way to a $126 peak. March records the largest monthly oil price rise in history.
• 10 March: US intelligence reports Iranian minelaying; the US says it has destroyed 16 minelaying craft.
• 27 March: The IRGC bans all vessels travelling to or from ports of the US, Israel and their allies.
• 13 April: The US imposes its own blockade on Iranian ports — what the Guardian calls a "dual blockade". By 21 April an estimated 2,000 ships and 20,000 seafarers are stranded inside the Gulf.
• 17–18 April: Iran briefly admits limited traffic after the Israel–Lebanon ceasefire — 13 tankers pass — then reimposes restrictions because the US blockade remains.
• 4–5 May: The US Navy launches Operation Project Freedom to escort merchant ships out of the Gulf. Iran responds by creating a "Persian Gulf Strait Authority" to license transits.
• 17–18 June: The Islamabad Memorandum promises toll-free passage for 60 days; CENTCOM lifts the blockade of Iranian ports.
• 20–27 June: Iran declares the strait closed again, citing Israeli strikes. The Ever Lovely is hit on 25 June while using a route close to Oman; the US strikes Iranian coastal sites on 27 June.
• 7–8 July: Iran fires on three vessels near Omani waters. Washington revokes Iran's oil licence and President Trump declares the memorandum "over". Fatal attacks follow on the GFS Galaxy (11 July) and Mombasa B (14 July).
• 25 August: US officials say more than 100 suspected mines have been cleared using underwater drones and contractors.
• 31 August – 13 September: The Saudi tanker Sidr is abandoned with two dead; the Hercules Star and El Gaia are hit in September. The US strikes three Iranian tankers; the IRGC claims six vessels in reply. A drone launched from Iraq damages Saudi Arabia's East–West pipeline.

HOW THE CLOSURE IS ENFORCED

Selective denial, not a wall

Iran has not physically sealed the strait. It has made transit uninsurable for anyone it has not approved. The Persian Gulf Strait Authority, set up on 5 May, issues permissions to vessels from states Tehran designates as friendly — seven Malaysian ships were let through as early as 6 April — while everyone else faces the risk of attack. The routing dispute that destroyed the June memorandum follows the same logic: Iran requires ships to pass close to its own coast, under its supervision, and has attacked vessels using the lane nearer Oman that the US and the Joint Maritime Information Center promoted.

Drones, missiles and fast boats

Compiled incident lists record about 72 attacks between March and September, killing 20 seafarers and a port worker and injuring 35. Six ships have been seized, including the MSC Epaminondas and MSC Francesca. Targets have ranged from VLCCs and container ships to tugs and the LNG carriers Al Rekayyat and Gaslog Shanghai, both disabled in late summer. Liberia-, Marshall Islands- and Panama-flagged ships account for most incidents, reflecting the world fleet rather than any political selection.

Mines and electronic interference

Mines have done less physical damage than drones but more to confidence. A channel that might contain mines has to be treated as though it does, and six months into the crisis US clearance operations are still under way. Widespread GNSS jamming and spoofing add collision and grounding risk in crowded, shallow water.

WHY ESCORTS HAVE NOT REOPENED THE STRAIT

Washington's public position is that the waterway is open. Energy Secretary Chris Wright said in mid-September that about 10 million barrels a day were moving — "two-thirds or north of two-thirds of previous flows" — and President Trump has described the US as being in "total control". Independent tracking does not support this. IMF PortWatch logged eight transits on 13 September against a pre-crisis norm of about 85 a day; Al Jazeera's ten-day average was 14. As market analyst Chris Beauchamp put it, "Hormuz is not under its control, and oil is not flowing freely."

The gap is explained by economics rather than firepower. War-risk premiums stand at 3–10% of hull value per voyage, against 0.125–0.25% before the war — several million dollars for a single VLCC transit. Escorts can reduce the chance of a hit but cannot make a voyage insurable, and crews and owners have watched ships burn under escort-era conditions in July, August and September. Project Freedom was paused on 6 June when a deal seemed close and has not recovered its tempo since the truce broke down.

ECONOMIC IMPACT

• Crude: Brent peaked at $126 in the spring, fell back below $100 over the summer, and has climbed again in September — around $97 on 7 September, $107.82 on 14 September, then easing toward $102 as Saudi Arabia said it could restore about half the damaged pipeline's capacity within days.
• Consumers: US gasoline averaged $4.15 a gallon in early September, up 39% from $2.98 on the day the war began; diesel set an all-time record near $5.90.
• Asia: About 84% of Hormuz crude was bound for Asian buyers. China, which took a third of its oil through the strait, is leaning on a strategic reserve of roughly one billion barrels and on Russian supply, which now covers close to half its daily needs.
• Gas and fertilizer: Qatar's LNG — 12–14% of Europe's LNG imports — is largely trapped, as are 30–35% of world urea exports and 20–30% of ammonia exports, with knock-on effects for food prices. Aluminium and helium supply have also been hit.
• Buffers are thinner: The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve has been heavily drawn down, leaving less capacity to absorb a further shock heading into northern-hemisphere winter.

The bypass routes are now targets

Saudi Arabia's East–West pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea and the UAE's Habshan–Fujairah line are the main routes by which Gulf crude can reach the market without using the strait. Neither can replace the strait, and September has shown that neither is safe. A drone launched from Iraq temporarily shut the East–West line — by itself equivalent to about 4% of global supply — and Aramco's Jizan refinery has been struck twice in a month. Al Jazeera also reports renewed Houthi pressure on the Bab el-Mandeb approach, which threatens the Red Sea outlet that the Saudi bypass depends on. For more on that theatre see our Red Sea briefing.

DIPLOMATIC SITUATION

Article 5 of the June memorandum committed Iran to "make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days". It did not say which lane, under whose authority, or what would happen on day 61. Those omissions were where the deal broke. The underlying dispute is about sovereignty: Iran wants recognition of its administrative role over the strait — licensing, routing and eventually fees — while the US and the Gulf Arab states insist on unrestricted transit passage under the law of the sea.

Since President Trump declared the memorandum dead and promised a "crushing economic operation", direct US–Iran contact has stopped. The live channel is Iran–Oman, the two coastal states, discussing a joint management arrangement; a round scheduled for 14 September was postponed and no breakthrough is expected soon. Pakistan continues to try to revive direct talks. Any durable arrangement will also have to address the US posture toward Iranian exports, since Tehran has treated the closure and the blockade as a single issue from the start. The nuclear dimension is covered in our Iran nuclear briefing.

OUTLOOK

• Prolonged partial closure (most likely): Traffic stays at 10–20% of normal, limited to approved and escorted vessels, with periodic attacks and oil in a $95–115 range driven by headlines. Attacks on bypass infrastructure become the main escalation channel.
• Oman-brokered management deal: A technical arrangement on lanes and inspections allows insurers to return gradually. Even in this case, mine clearance and the backlog of stranded ships mean normal volumes would take months to restore.
• Military escalation: A renewed US–Israeli campaign — for example against the Pickaxe Mountain nuclear site — or a mass-casualty attack on a Gulf facility triggers a full closure again and a retest of the spring price highs.

Indicators to watch: daily transit counts from IMF PortWatch; war-risk premium quotes; whether the Iran–Oman round is rescheduled; the repair timeline and security of the East–West pipeline; and any change in the US position on Iranian oil exports.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

Is the Strait of Hormuz closed right now?

Effectively, yes. As of mid-September 2026 only around 8–14 commercial vessels a day are passing, compared with 85–100 before the war. Iran allows ships it has approved; others risk attack, and most insurers will not cover the transit at a commercial price.

When did Iran close the Strait of Hormuz?

The IRGC Navy began warning ships off on 28 February 2026, within hours of the first US–Israeli strikes on Iran, and formally confirmed the closure on 2 March. It briefly eased restrictions in mid-April and again after the 17 June memorandum, but reimposed them both times.

How many ships have been attacked?

About 72 incidents were recorded between March and September 2026, killing at least 20 seafarers and injuring 35. Six vessels have been seized.

How high did oil prices go?

Brent crude peaked at about $126 a barrel in spring 2026, after the largest monthly price rise on record in March. In mid-September it was trading between roughly $102 and $108.

Why can't the US Navy simply reopen the strait?

Escorts and mine clearance reduce risk but do not remove it, and commercial shipping depends on insurance. With war-risk premiums at 3–10% of a ship's value per voyage and vessels still being hit, most owners will not send ships through regardless of naval protection.

Can pipelines replace the Strait of Hormuz?

Only partly. Saudi Arabia's East–West pipeline and the UAE's Habshan–Fujairah line bypass the strait but carry a fraction of normal Gulf exports, and the East–West line was itself damaged by a drone attack in September 2026.

What would reopen the strait?

A political agreement on who manages transit. Talks between Iran and Oman on a joint arrangement are the most active channel, but a round planned for mid-September was postponed, and direct US–Iran talks have been suspended since July.

AUTHOR

SOURCES AND REFERENCES

• Al Jazeera — Why are oil futures beyond $100? (14 September 2026)
• Al Jazeera — Oil prices surge as US–Iran strikes intensify (7 September 2026)
• IMF PortWatch — chokepoint transit data
• Congressional Research Service — The Strait of Hormuz: Security Developments (R45281)
• 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis — compiled incident list (Wikipedia)
• International Energy Agency (IEA)
• U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)
• Reuters – Energy
• Lloyd's List (Maritime)
• United Nations OCHA